Goodyear and Hertz: Reconciling Two Recent Supreme Court Decisions by Blanchard, Lindsey D.
McGeorge Law Review
Volume 44 | Issue 4 Article 3
1-1-2013
Goodyear and Hertz: Reconciling Two Recent
Supreme Court Decisions
Lindsey D. Blanchard
University of St. Thomas School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
McGeorge Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lindsey D. Blanchard, Goodyear and Hertz: Reconciling Two Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 44 McGeorge L. Rev. 865 (2013).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/3
_02_BLANCHARD_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2014 9:39 AM 
 
865 
Goodyear and Hertz: Reconciling Two Recent Supreme 
Court Decisions 
Lindsey D. Blanchard* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 865 
II. GOODYEAR AND THE “ESSENTIALLY AT HOME” TEST: WHAT DOES IT 
MEAN? ......................................................................................................... 867 
 A.  General Personal Jurisdiction Pre-Goodyear ....................................... 869 
 B.   Goodyear and the “Essentially at Home” Test ..................................... 873 
 C.   Goodyear Aftermath .............................................................................. 875 
III. EXAMINING THE “PRECEDENT”: HERTZ AND THE "PRINCIPAL PLACE OF 
BUSINESS" TEST ........................................................................................... 878 
 A.  Corporate Citizenship and the Pre-Hertz Principal Place of 
Business Tests ........................................................................................ 879 
 B.   Hertz and the “Nerve Center” Test ....................................................... 882 
IV. APPLYING THE “PRECEDENT”: USING HERTZ TO EXPLAIN GOODYEAR ....... 884 
 A.   Interpreting “Essentially at Home” to Make the Most Sense of the 
Particular Language Used by the Court in Light of Existing 
Precedent ............................................................................................... 885 
  1.   A Corporation is “at Home” in Its State of Incorporation  
   and in the State Where Its Nerve Center is Located ....................... 886 
  2.  “Essentially” Creates a Cushion for Exercising General 
   Jurisdiction over Foreign-Country Corporations .......................... 889 
 B.   Interpreting “Essentially at Home” to Address Important Due 
Process and Administrative Goals ........................................................ 892 
  1.   Promoting Fairness, Predictability, and Reasonableness .............. 893 
  2.   Promoting Simplicity and Administrative Efficiency ...................... 899 
V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 900 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One rarely thinks of civil procedure issues when contemplating the hot topics in 
front of the U.S. Supreme Court. However, the Roberts Court put civil procedure 
back on the map by planting some long-overlooked issues on its docket.1 In 
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particular, the Court granted certiorari to resolve two jurisdiction-related questions 
over the course of its 2009 and 2010 terms: where is a corporation’s “principal place 
of business” located for purposes of diversity subject matter jurisdiction, and when 
may a court exercise general personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporate 
defendant? After decades of silence on these issues,2 the Court resolved each 
question with a unanimous opinion. During its 2009 term, the Court ruled in Hertz 
Corp. v. Friend3 that a corporation’s principal place of business is its “nerve 
center”—i.e., “the place where a corporation’s officers direct, control, and coordinate 
the corporation’s activities.”4 At the end of its 2010 term, the Court ruled in 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown5 that a court may assert general 
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation only when the defendant’s “affiliations with 
the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [the defendant] essentially at 
home in the forum State.”6 
While the Court in Hertz made it very clear which contacts matter for 
purposes of determining a corporation’s principal place of business, many 
scholars and practitioners have suggested that Goodyear leaves a bit to be desired 
in terms of articulating how many or what types of contacts result in a foreign 
corporation being “essentially at home” in a given forum.7 However, while 
diversity of citizenship subject matter jurisdiction and general personal 
jurisdiction are two fundamentally different concepts (the former relates to a 
court’s ability to adjudicate the particular case before it,8 while the latter relates 
 
would like to thank Professor Bradley G. Clary for his advice and feedback on an earlier draft of this Article. 
1. See Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 REV. LITIG. 313, 
314–15 (2012) (noting that “the Roberts Court is newly engaged in an unexpected area—civil procedure” and 
“has heard and decided more than twenty cases in core civil procedure areas, including pleading, summary 
judgment, relation back of amended pleadings, personal jurisdiction, federal question jurisdiction, diversity 
jurisdiction, jurisdictionality, removal procedure, class actions, civil representation, arbitration of civil and civil 
rights claims in lieu of litigation, appealability, remedies, and the Erie-Hanna doctrine”). 
2. See id. at 316–17 (noting that the Court’s October 2009 term decision regarding the meaning of 
“principal place of business” under the diversity jurisdiction statute marked the first time the Court had 
addressed the issue since the statute was enacted in 1958 and that the Court’s October 2010 term decisions 
regarding personal jurisdiction were the first on that topic in over two decades). 
3. 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010). 
4. Id. at 1192. 
5. 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
6. Id. at 2851 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)). 
7. See, e.g., Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of “Essentially at Home” in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S.C. L. REV. 
527, 533 (2012) [hereinafter Stein, Meaning] (“Assuming that the Court intends to permit the exercise of 
general jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations only when they are ‘essentially at home’ in the forum, courts 
must flesh out what that means. What are the attributes of being ‘at home’ that justify jurisdiction? And what is 
the meaning of ‘essentially’? Presumably, that is something short of ‘actually’ being at home, but how short?”); 
Collyn A. Peddie, Mi Casa Es Su Casa: Enterprise Theory and General Jurisdiction over Foreign  
Corporations After Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 63 S.C. L. REV. 697, 698 (2012) 
(quoting Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851) (“[T]he Court . . . failed to define, for future cases, what it meant by 
‘essentially at home,’ a phrase it has used in no other context.”). 
8. See infra note 90 and accompanying text. 
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to a court’s ability to bind a particular defendant by its ruling9), they are linked in 
that the goal of both inquiries is to find the geographic location where the 
defendant’s contacts are the most significant. Moreover, the analyses raise 
similar concerns of fairness, efficiency, and predictability. Thus, although 
Goodyear—standing alone—may be somewhat vague, it gains meaning when 
read in conjunction with Hertz. 
Part II of this Article summarizes the history of general jurisdiction, the 
Court’s decision in Goodyear, and the proposed interpretations of the new 
“essentially at home” test.10 Part III provides a general overview of the history of 
diversity jurisdiction, the Court’s decision in Hertz, and the current “principal 
place of business” test.11 Lastly, Part IV argues that the “essentially at home” test 
in Goodyear should be given meaning by strictly adhering to the Court’s 
language and precedent, including its earlier opinion in Hertz.12 In doing so, Part 
IV demonstrates how the two opinions can—and should—be reconciled: Courts 
should find a corporation to be “at home” only in the state where it is 
incorporated and in the state where its “nerve center” is located. If the 
corporation’s headquarters is located outside of the United States, the court 
should determine whether the corporation has comparable administrative and 
executive contacts in any one location within the United States such that it is 
“essentially at home” in that location. 
II. GOODYEAR AND THE “ESSENTIALLY AT HOME” TEST:  
WHAT DOES IT MEAN? 
“Personal jurisdiction” is a fundamental concept for every litigator. 
Essentially, it provides a court with the power to subject a defendant to the 
court’s adjudicative process and to render a binding judgment.13 A court may 
exercise two types of personal jurisdiction over a given defendant: specific or 
general. Specific jurisdiction provides the ability to hale the defendant into court 
in a particular forum because the cause of action arose from the defendant’s 
 
9. See infra note 13 and accompanying text. 
10. See infra Part II.  
11. See infra Part III. 
12. See infra Part IV.  
13. See, e.g., Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, The Predictability Principle in Personal Jurisdiction 
Doctrine: A Case Study on the Effects of a “Generally” Too Broad, but “Specifically” Too Narrow Approach 
to Minimum Contacts, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 135, 136–37 (2005) [hereinafter Rhodes, Predictability Principle]; 
S. Wilson Quick, Comment, Staying Afloat in the Stream of Commerce: Goodyear, McIntyre, and the Ship of 
Personal Jurisdiction, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 547, 552 (2011) (citing FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., 
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.3, at 60 (5th ed. 2001)) (“The basic premise of the personal jurisdiction doctrine requires 
that a court have the necessary authority to engage in binding adjudication over a person.”); Kulko v. Superior 
Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978) (“‘It has long been the rule that a valid judgment imposing a personal obligation 
or duty in favor of the plaintiff may be entered only by a court having jurisdiction over the person of the 
defendant.’”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 870 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “personal jurisdiction” as “[a] court’s 
power to bring a person [including a corporation] into its adjudicative process”). 
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minimum contacts with that forum.14 General jurisdiction provides the ability to 
hale the defendant into court in a particular forum based on the defendant’s 
substantial contacts with that forum, even though the claim at issue is unrelated 
to the forum or those contacts.15  
The rules for determining whether a court’s exercise of specific or general 
jurisdiction is appropriate remained virtually unchanged for decades.16 Then, on 
June 27, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down two significant opinions: J. 
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro17 and Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 
S.A. v. Brown. In McIntyre, a fractured Court discussed the limits on the exercise 
of specific jurisdiction over a foreign corporate defendant whose products have 
reached the forum—and caused injury therein—through the stream of 
commerce.18 In Goodyear, a unanimous Court expounded upon the test for 
determining when a court may assert general jurisdiction over a foreign corporate 
 
14. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984) (“It has been said 
that when a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the 
defendant’s contacts with the forum, the State is exercising ‘specific jurisdiction’ over the defendant.”) 
(citations omitted); Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested 
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966) (“[A]ffiliations between the forum and the underlying 
controversy normally support only the power to adjudicate with respect to issues deriving from, or connected 
with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction to adjudicate. This we call specific jurisdiction.”); Megan 
M. La Belle, The Future of Internet-Related Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear Dunlap Tires v. Brown and 
J. McIntyre v. Nicastro, 15 J. INTERNET L. 3, 4 (2012) (“Specific jurisdiction . . . requires less pervasive contacts 
between the defendant and the forum state. Under this doctrine, . . . courts are only permitted to exercise 
jurisdiction over a defendant if the lawsuit arises out of—or is related to—the defendant’s contacts with the 
forum.”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 870 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “specific jurisdiction” as “[j]urisdiction that 
stems from the defendant’s having certain minimum contacts with the forum state so that the court may hear a 
case whose issues arise from those minimum contacts”). 
15. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415 n.9 (“When a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in 
a suit not arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum, the State has been said to be 
exercising ‘general jurisdiction’ over the defendant.”) (citations omitted); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 
14, at 1136 (stating that “general jurisdiction” is the “power to adjudicate any kind of controversy when 
jurisdiction is based on relationships, direct or indirect, between the forum and the person or persons whose 
legal rights are to be affected”); Meir Feder, Goodyear, “Home,” and the Uncertain Future of Doing Business 
Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L. REV. 671, 672 (2012) (quoting Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851) (“General jurisdiction is 
the branch of personal jurisdiction that allows a forum state to assert judicial authority over ‘any and all claims’ 
against a defendant that has a sufficiently close connection to the state—even claims arising from conduct 
elsewhere that is completely unrelated to the state.”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 869 (8th ed. 2004) (defining 
“general jurisdiction” as “[a] court’s authority to hear all claims against a defendant . . . without any showing 
that a connection exists between the claims and the forum state”). 
16. See Howard B. Stravitz, Introduction to Personal Jurisdiction for the Twenty-First Century: The 
Implications of McIntyre and Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 63 S.C. L. REV. 463, 463 (2012) [hereinafter Stravitz, 
Introduction] (noting that the personal jurisdiction opinions issued by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2011 “were 
the first cases on personal jurisdiction in twenty-two years”); Richard D. Freer, Personal Jurisdiction in the 
Twenty-First Century: The Ironic Legacy of Justice Brennan, 63 S.C. L. REV. 551, 551 (2012) (noting that the 
personal jurisdiction decisions issued by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2011 were “the Supreme Court’s first 
efforts at applying International Shoe Co. v. Washington since . . . 1990”). 
17. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
18. See id. at 2785, 2787–91. 
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defendant.19 While McIntyre caused an immediate outcry among academics and 
practitioners,20 Goodyear generally is thought to have been rightly decided and is 
considered a positive development in the law.21 That being said, several 
commentators have noted that the “essentially at home” test, as articulated by the 
Court, is not a lesson in clarity.22 
A. General Personal Jurisdiction Pre-Goodyear 
The Court’s most notable personal jurisdiction jurisprudence began well over 
a century ago, with its seminal decision in Pennoyer v. Neff.23 In that case, the 
 
19. 131 S. Ct. at 2850–51. 
20. For example, the South Carolina Law Review hosted a Symposium entitled “Personal Jurisdiction 
for the Twenty-First Century: The Implications of McIntyre and Goodyear Dunlop Tires” on October 13 and 
14, 2011. Stravitz, Introduction, supra note 16, at 463. The journal’s Symposium issue alone includes ten 
articles analyzing and critiquing McIntyre. See generally id. The consensus seems to be that the U.S. Supreme 
Court got it wrong, or at the very least, greatly muddied the waters of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. See, 
e.g., Adam N. Steinman, The Lay of the Land: Examining the Three Opinions in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. 
Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV. 481, 491 (2012) (“The lack of any majority opinion in McIntyre largely thwarts the 
possibility of ‘greater clarity,’ at least in the short term.”); John Vail, Six Questions in Light of J. McIntyre 
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV. 517, 517 (2012) (“[T]he result in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. 
Nicastro is viscerally upsetting, and the plurality opinion is intellectually perplexing. . . . I make no secret that I 
think the case was wrongly decided.”); Michael H. Hoffheimer, General Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 549, 550–51 (2012) (“[McIntyre] provoked a 
spirited dissent and was greeted with much criticism and alarm.”) (citations omitted); Paul D. Carrington, 
Business Interests and the Long Arm in 2011, 63 S.C. L. REV. 637, 641 (2012) (“The McIntyre case was . . . 
wrongly decided.”). 
21. See Stein, Meaning, supra note 7, at 528 (“I believe that [Goodyear] will prove to be one of the 
wisest and most consequential jurisdictional decisions in recent years. . . . [I]ts apparent constriction of general 
jurisdiction . . . represents a positive development.”); Feder, supra note 15, at 673 (“Goodyear . . . goes a long 
way toward putting general jurisdiction, for the first time, on a solid theoretical footing.”); Peddie, supra note 7, 
at 726 (stating that “the Supreme Court’s decision in Goodyear represents a predictable, necessary, and 
incremental step in the Court’s continuing efforts to keep jurisdictional rules in line with the realities of modern 
transnational commerce”). But see Hoffheimer, supra note 20, at 609 (“Justice Ginsberg’s opinion conflates a 
variety of approaches but fails to communicate a coherent, shared vision of the underlying principles of 
personal jurisdiction. . . . This Article argues that even the most generous reading of the opinion leaves 
important practical questions unanswered.”). 
22. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; Quick, supra note 13, at 586 (“While Goodyear does 
clarify that the stream of commerce doctrine is not applicable to general jurisdiction analysis, neither [Goodyear 
nor McIntyre] provides the degree of clarity going forward that practitioners had hoped for when the Court 
agreed to hear the cases in tandem at the beginning of the term.”). 
23. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Since the Court rendered its decision in Goodyear, numerous commentators 
have discussed the history of general personal jurisdiction in great detail. See, e.g., Hoffheimer, supra note 20, 
at 553–69; Quick, supra note 13, at 553–62; Peddie, supra note 7, at 713–15; Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, 
Nineteenth Century Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine in a Twenty-First Century World, 64 FLA. L. REV. 387, 
390–412, 422–24 (2012) [hereinafter Rhodes, Nineteenth Century]. And, of course, the topic was discussed in 
the literature at great length prior to the 2011 decision. See, e.g., Robert J. Condlin, “Defendant Veto” or 
“Totality of the Circumstances”? It’s Time for the Supreme Court to Straighten Out the Personal Jurisdiction 
Standard Once Again, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 53, 56–60, 66–72, 96–100 (2004); Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, 
Clarifying General Jurisdiction, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 807, 812–18, 829–55 (2004) [hereinafter Rhodes, 
Clarifying General Jurisdiction]; Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 
721, 727–72 (1988); Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 614–30 (1988) 
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Court found that the defendant’s presence within a court’s geographic territory 
was a necessary prerequisite for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant.24 More importantly, however, the Court tied personal jurisdiction 
directly to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by stating that 
the legitimacy of void judgments—i.e., judgments not entitled to full faith and 
credit by other states—could be questioned “‘on the ground that proceedings in a 
court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over 
whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law.’”25 
While the Court did not state that the Due Process Clause provides the 
substantive criteria for determining whether a court’s exercise of personal 
jurisdiction is appropriate, later iterations of the Court seem to interpret the 
opinion that way.26 
For example, in its next pivotal case on personal jurisdiction, International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington,27 the Court focused on the “requirements” imposed by 
the Due Process Clause: “[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a 
defendant to a judgment in personam, . . . he have certain minimum contacts with 
 
[hereinafter Twitchell, Myth]; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at 1135–44; Kristopher B. Knox, Note, 
Davis v. St. John’s Health System, Inc.: General Jurisdiction, the Door is Ajar, But How Far Will It Open?, 56 
ARK. L. REV. 647, 650–60 (2003); Kristina L. Angus, Note, The Demise of General Jurisdiction: Why the 
Supreme Court Must Define the Parameters of General Jurisdiction, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 63, 66–72 (2002); 
see also Quick, supra note 13, at 551 (citing Andrew L. Strauss, Beyond National Law: The Neglected Role of 
the International Law of Personal Jurisdiction in Domestic Courts, 36 HARV. INT’L L.J. 373, 381 (1995)) (“It is 
possible that personal jurisdiction has been the subject of more academic commentary than any other area of 
American law.”). Therefore, Part II.A. of this Article is not meant to provide a comprehensive history of general 
personal jurisdiction but rather to offer only a very brief summary in an attempt to give context to the rest of the 
piece. 
24. Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got to Do with It? Due Process, Personal 
Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. REV. 729, 733–34 (2012); see Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citing Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733) (“Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render 
judgment in personam is grounded on their de facto power over the defendant’s person. Hence his presence 
within the territorial jurisdiction of court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding 
him.”); Quick, supra note 13, at 556 (citing Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722) (“The jurisdictional standard at the [turn 
of the twentieth century], as established in Pennoyer, restricted jurisdictional authority to persons or corporate 
entities ‘present’ within the state’s territorial boundaries.”). 
25. Perdue, supra note 24, at 731 (quoting Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733); see also id. at 730 (“It is [in 
Pennoyer] that the Court . . . , for the first time, introduced the Due Process Clause into personal jurisdiction 
doctrine.”); Stein, Meaning, supra note 7, at 534 (“Pennoyer v. Neff constitutionalized the law of personal 
jurisdiction. It held that assertions of jurisdiction by courts that lacked legitimate authority over the defendant 
violated the Due Process Clause.”) (citations omitted). 
26. Perdue, supra note 24, at 732–34, 738–39; see also Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, 
Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1246 (2011) (“It is 
debatable . . . whether Pennoyer actually invoked the Due Process Clause to set substantive limitations on state-
court jurisdiction. It is at least as likely that the Pennoyer Court simply meant that due process principles give 
the defendant the right to attack an assertion of jurisdiction under whatever rules the forum state sets, but set no 
geographical boundaries on the state’s assertions of jurisdiction over non-residents.”). 
27. 326 U.S. at 310. 
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it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice.’”28 The Court explained that: 
[w]hether due process is satisfied must depend . . . upon the quality and 
nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of 
the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure. 
That clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a 
judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with 
which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.29 
In regard to corporations, the Court stated that “there have been instances in 
which the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so 
substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action 
arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”30 Thus, the opinion 
was significant not only for replacing personal jurisdiction’s “presence” 
requirement with a “contacts” or “conduct” requirement,31 but also for 
introducing—albeit without naming—the concept of general jurisdiction.32 
The Court went on to discuss this new notion of general personal jurisdiction 
in only two cases prior to rendering its opinion in Goodyear33: Perkins v. Benguet 
Consolidated Mining Co.34 and Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. 
Hall.35 In Perkins, the Court stated that “[t]he essence of the issue . . . at the 
constitutional level, is . . . one of general fairness to the corporation.”36 The Court 
found that the Due Process Clause did not preclude an Ohio state court from 
exercising jurisdiction over a foreign-country corporation to adjudicate a cause of 
action that did not arise out of or relate to the corporation’s activity in Ohio, 
because the company’s president “carried on in Ohio a continuous and systematic 
supervision” of the company’s activities.37 This “continuous and systematic 
 
28. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
29. Id. at 319 (citations omitted). 
30. Id. at 318 (citing Missouri, K. & T.R. Co. v. Reynolds, 255 U.S. 565 (1921)); Tauza v. Susquehanna 
Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915 (N.Y. 1917)). 
31. Stein, Meaning, supra note 7, at 533; Peddie, supra note 7, at 713–14; Howard B. Stravitz, Sayonara 
to Fair Play and Substantial Justice?, 63 S.C. L. REV. 745, 747–48 (2012) [hereinafter Stravitz, Sayonara]; 
Hoffheimer, supra note 20, at 561; Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, supra note 23, at 812–13; Quick, 
supra note 13, at 556–58. 
32. See, e.g., Stein, Meaning, supra note 7, at 535 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318) (noting that the 
International Shoe Court’s statement “that there have been ‘instances in which the continuous corporate 
operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on 
[unrelated] causes of action’” is “what we now deem general jurisdiction”); B. Glenn George, In Search of 
General Jurisdiction, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1097, 1103 (1990) (“In modern terminology, the [International Shoe] 
Court acknowledged the use of general jurisdiction in appropriate cases.”). 
33. E.g., Stein, Meaning, supra note 7, at 533; Feder, supra note 15, at 674. 
34. 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
35. 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
36. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 445. 
37. Id. at 448. 
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supervision” consisted of maintaining a temporary company headquarters from 
which the president drafted business correspondence, distributed paychecks, 
maintained active company bank accounts, held directors’ meetings, and 
developed policies.38 
In contrast, the Helicopteros Court found a Texas state court’s exercise of 
general jurisdiction over a foreign-country corporation to be inappropriate where 
the company’s chief executive officer made only one trip to Texas, accepted 
checks drawn on a Texas bank, made purchases from a Texas company, and sent 
personnel to Texas for training.39 The Court held that such contacts did not 
“constitute the kind of continuous and systematic general business contacts the 
Court found to exist in Perkins”40 and were, therefore, “insufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”41 While 
these opinions provide concrete examples of when a corporation is or is not 
subject to general jurisdiction, they do little to guide the lower courts in terms of 
the specific nature, number, and frequency of contacts necessary to establish 
general jurisdiction on any other sets of facts.42 Accordingly, even though Perkins 
was the only Supreme Court case to uphold a state court’s exercise of general 
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation, lower courts greatly expanded the 
doctrine’s reach beyond the location of a pseudo-headquarters as approved in that 
case.43 In particular, courts regularly exercise general jurisdiction over 
corporations that do “continuous and systematic business” or have “regular and 
consistent commercial activities” in the forum state.44 Thus, the general 
jurisdiction standard was begging for clarification when Goodyear reached the 
Supreme Court. 
 
38. Id. at 447–48.  
39. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415–16. 
40. Id. at 416. 
41. Id. at 418–19. 
42. See, e.g., Feder, supra note 15, at 674–75 (“The standard that most lower courts extracted from 
[Perkins and Helicopteros]—a requirement of ‘continuous and systematic’ contacts—provided little meaningful 
guidance. Among other things, it failed to address what types of contacts are necessary, how extensive those 
contacts should be, and how continuous they must be.”) (citations omitted); Knox, supra note 23, at 667 
(“[O]nly two Supreme Court cases have been decided on general personal jurisdiction grounds, neither of which 
adequately defined what constituted a sufficient level of contact to support general jurisdiction. . . . Instead, the 
Court’s general jurisdiction opinions have done no more than simply list the contacts present and then render an 
assessment of whether those contacts were ‘systematic and continuous.’”); Angus, supra note 23, at 79 (“In 
making their decisions, neither the Perkins Court nor the Helicopteros Court established any guidelines as to the 
parameters of general jurisdiction.”). 
43. See Feder, supra note 15, at 675 (“[L]ower courts have expanded general jurisdiction well beyond 
[Perkins], applying it even to corporations with conspicuously insubstantial connections to the forum.”). 
44. Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business With Doing-Business Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 171, 173 [hereinafter Twitchell, Doing Business]. 
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B.  Goodyear and the “Essentially at Home” Test 
On September 28, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown to determine “[w]hether a 
foreign corporation is subject to general personal jurisdiction, on causes of action 
not arising out of or related to any contacts between it and the forum state, 
merely because other entities distribute in the forum state products placed in the 
stream of commerce by the defendant.”45 In that case, North Carolina residents 
sued the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company (incorporated in Ohio), as well as 
three of its foreign subsidiaries (incorporated in Luxembourg, Turkey, and 
France), in North Carolina state court on a products liability claim resulting from 
an accident that occurred abroad.46 The foreign corporations moved to dismiss the 
case for lack of personal jurisdiction.47 In affirming the trial court’s denial of the 
motion, the court of appeals held that North Carolina had general jurisdiction 
over the defendants because the defendants had placed their products (though 
products different than those at issue in the lawsuit) into the stream of commerce, 
the defendants had done nothing to prevent the products from reaching North 
Carolina, and the products had in fact eventually reached North Carolina.48 In 
addition, the court of appeals found that North Carolina had an interest in 
providing a forum for its aggrieved citizens and that the plaintiffs would be 
burdened by having to travel abroad to litigate their claims.49 
After the North Carolina Supreme Court denied review, the foreign 
defendants petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, arguing that 
the North Carolina courts had “vastly exceed[ed] the scope of general jurisdiction 
permitted by [the U.S. Supreme] Court’s decisions.”50 On June 27, 2011, the U.S. 
Supreme Court issued its first decision regarding general personal jurisdiction 
since Helicopteros was decided twenty-seven years prior.51 The Court held that 
even though some of the foreign defendants’ products “had reached North 
Carolina through the ‘stream of commerce,’” such a connection was “so limited” 
that it “[did] not establish the ‘continuous and systematic’ affiliation necessary” 
to allow North Carolina courts to exercise general personal jurisdiction.52 Thus, 
the Court noted, the “petitioners [were] in no sense at home in North Carolina.”53 
 
45. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 
2846 (2011) (No. 10-76), 2010 WL 2786988, at *i; see Mem. Granting Petition for Cert., 131 S. Ct. 63, 63 
(2010). 
46. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2850–52. 
47. Id. at 2852. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 2853. 
50. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 45, at 12.  
51. See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2846. 
52. Id. at 2851. 
53. Id. at 2857. 
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In reaching its decision, the Court determined that the North Carolina courts 
had conflated the standards for specific and general personal jurisdiction.54 
Therefore, the Court summarized the differences between the two, as well as the 
development of general personal jurisdiction doctrine.55 In doing so, the Court 
noted that International Shoe remains the “canonical opinion in this area.”56 The 
Court also provided numerous interesting jurisdiction-related tidbits. Perhaps the 
most tantalizing language offered by the Court is its articulation and explanation 
of the general jurisdiction test: 
A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or 
foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims against them 
when their affiliations with the State are so “continuous and systematic” 
as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.57 
. . .  
For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general 
jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an 
equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at 
home.58 
Thus, the “essentially at home” standard was born. And, the only explicit help the 
Court provided for interpreting that standard was its assertion that “[a] 
corporation’s ‘continuous activity of some sorts within a state . . . is not enough 
to support the demand that the corporation be amenable to suits unrelated to that 
activity,’”59 and its comment that “Perkins . . . remains ‘[t]he textbook case of 
general jurisdiction appropriately exercised over a foreign corporation.’”60 
In addition, while the Due Process Clause certainly was not the focus of the 
Court’s opinion, the Court did frame the question before it as whether the North 
Carolina state court’s exercise of general jurisdiction was “consistent with the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”61 The Court also reiterated 
its post-Pennoyer version of the link between personal jurisdiction and due 
process—i.e., that the Due Process Clause provides the substantive criteria for 
determining whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a particular 
 
54. Id. at 2851; see id. at 2855 (“The North Carolina court’s stream-of-commerce analysis elided the 
essential difference between case-specific and all-purpose (general) jurisdiction.”). 
55. See id. at 2851, 2853–56. 
56. Id. at 2853. 
57. Id. at 2851 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)) (emphasis added). 
58. Id. at 2853–54 (citing Brilmayer et al., supra note 23, at 728) (emphasis added). 
59. Id. at 2856 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318). 
60. Id. (quoting Donahue v. Far E. Air Transp. Corp., 652 F.2d 1032, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). 
61. Id. at 2853. 
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defendant is appropriate.62 Thus, the Court rejected the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals’ attempt to justify its decision based on the state’s interest in providing a 
convenient forum for the plaintiffs and retained the focus on the defendants’ 
connection to the forum.63 
C.  Goodyear Aftermath 
Although the reaction to the outcome in Goodyear has been positive, 
academics and practitioners alike have lamented the “essentially at home” 
language the Court used in reaching that outcome.64 According to one professor, 
the opinion “raises as many questions as it answers,”65 particularly in regard to 
the meaning of “essentially” and “at home”66 and the number of forums in which 
a corporation can be considered essentially at home.67 While at least one 
academic believes the language should be disregarded,68 most critics tend to agree 
that Goodyear stands for something going forward—the question is what, 
exactly. 
In light of this confusion, several commentators have proposed 
interpretations of Goodyear’s language in an attempt to provide guidance to the 
lower courts.69 Some have taken a broad view of the Court’s vague language. For 
 
62. Id. (“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment sets the outer boundaries of a state 
tribunal’s authority to proceed against a defendant.”). 
63. See id. at 2857 (“[P]etitioners are in no sense at home in North Carolina. Their attenuated 
connections to the State fall far short of the [sic] ‘the continuous and systematic general business contacts’ 
necessary to empower North Carolina to entertain suit against them on claims unrelated to anything that 
connects them to the State.”) (citations omitted); see id. at 2857 n.5 (“As earlier noted, the North Carolina Court 
of Appeals invoked the State’s ‘well-recognized interest in providing a forum in which its citizens are able to 
seek redress for injuries that they have sustained.’ But ‘[g]eneral jurisdiction to adjudicate has in [United States] 
practice never been based on the plaintiff’s relationship to the forum.’”) (citations omitted). 
64. See infra text accompanying notes 66–89.  
65. Stein, Meaning, supra note 7, at 528. 
66. Id. at 533; see Feder, supra note 15, at 677. 
67. Stein, Meaning, supra note 7, at 533; Feder, supra note 15, at 677. 
68. See Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts After Goodyear and McIntyre, 80 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 202, 217 (2011) (“A better reading of the case would be to focus on the particular facts of 
Goodyear and limit its meaning to the conclusion that the stream-of-commerce theory may not be utilized to 
establish general jurisdiction.”). 
69. This Article discusses the proposed interpretations that are the most thoroughly developed in the 
literature. However, commentators have cursorily mentioned other potential explanations of Goodyear, as well. 
See, e.g., Linda J. Silberman, Goodyear and Nicastro: Observations from a Transnational and Comparative 
Perspective, 63 S.C. L. REV. 591, 612 (2012) (predicting that “Goodyear will be read to identify a place where 
the corporation can said to be ‘present’ in the same way that the physical presence of the individual defendant is 
manifest”); Peterson, supra note 68, at 216–17 (stating that, despite language in the opinion that could be 
interpreted to limit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a corporation to states in which it is incorporated or 
has its principal place of business, “a more appropriate interpretation of Goodyear would be that some 
substantial volume of sales made directly into the forum state will continue to be sufficient”); Quick, supra note 
13 at 593 (“[T]he Court seemed to imply that, depending on a corporation’s business structure and operations, 
there may be an infinite number of places where a business could be found at home” but, “[a]t the very least, it 
would seem that a company must have formally registered to do business in a state, established a physical 
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example, Professor Allan Stein believes that, while the Court has significantly 
limited the availability of general jurisdiction,70 a corporation can be essentially at 
home in multiple places and that the default location should not be to a 
corporation’s principal place of business (or, “the locus of corporate decision-
making”).71 Rather, he thinks the “essentially at home” standard should be a 
measure of “whether the defendant would consider itself at home in the forum.”72 
Thus, Professor Stein proposes that in order to be subject to general jurisdiction 
in a particular forum, the corporation must be physically present in the forum, 
litigation must be as convenient for the corporation there as elsewhere, and the 
corporation’s activities there must be similar to its activities elsewhere.73 In 
addition to those criteria, Professor Stein advocates for consideration of the 
presence of employees, manufacturing facilities, and corporate offices in making 
the determination.74 
Collyn Peddie, counsel for the respondents in Goodyear, similarly rejects the 
notion that the place in which a corporation is essentially at home is limited to its 
state of incorporation or principal place of business.75 Rather, she believes “the 
Court imposed a broader, more ambiguous standard”76 to allow for flexible 
application “as corporate structures and means of commerce evolve.”77 Thus, Ms. 
Peddie proposes that the Court’s ruling allows for the use of an ever-changing 
test that “take[s] into account a host of plus factors, far too lengthy to list,” that 
should be “give[n] . . . different weight in different circumstances.”78 
Other commentators view the Goodyear opinion as much more limiting.79 For 
example, Meir Feder, the attorney who represented Goodyear in the litigation, 
thinks the Court may have intended for the “essentially at home” language to 
 
presence in the state, appointed agents in the state, and so on before general jurisdiction might attach.”). 
70. See Stein, Meaning, supra note 7, at 531–32 (discussing the “essentially at home” standard as a 
“constraint” that “aligns the Court with many academic commentators . . . who have advocated limiting 
significantly the operation of general jurisdiction”). 
71. Id. at 546. 
72. Id. at 538. According to Professor Stein, “[t]his approach is based on the premise that defendants 
have a unique relationship with their home; the relative singularity of that relationship is at the core of its  
justification.” Id. Another “touchstone” in the inquiry is “whether the judge or jury would view imposition of 
liability on the defendant to be an externality.” Id. at 543. 
73. Id. at 545–47. Professor Stein thinks a corporation also should be subject to general jurisdiction in its 
state or states of incorporation based on the corporation’s voluntary consent to the state’s governance. Id. at 
547. 
74. Id. 
75. See Peddie, supra note 7, at 713, 717. 
76. Id. at 713. 
77. Id. at 717. Ms. Peddie also states that in treating the “essentially at home” language as the 
“traditional standard . . . , the Court . . . focused on the supervisory aspect of Perkins, which, in modern 
parlance, would have allowed a court to exercise general jurisdiction where the corporate ‘brain’ resides.” Id. 
That, she contends, was the Court’s “effort to reconcile Goodyear and the Hertz line of decisions.” Id. 
78. Id. at 726. 
79. See infra text accompanying notes 81–86.  
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refer only to a corporation’s state of incorporation and principal place of 
business.80 Likewise, Professor Michael Hoffheimer has suggested that the 
opinion can be read to restrict general jurisdiction over corporations to those 
limited locations.81 However, Professor Hoffheimer ultimately believes that such 
a restriction “would effect a radical shift” that is not supported by personal 
jurisdiction precedent.82 Thus, he proposes that a “fair reading of the opinion” 
suggests that, while it will be “unusual,” there can be other states in which 
“extraordinarily high levels of activity may support . . . general jurisdiction.”83 He 
states that determining whether the “essentially at home” standard is satisfied 
will “require an inquiry into ‘activity’ and ‘contacts,’”84 such as where the 
corporation conducts “most” of its business or has “permanent offices, 
warehouses, or substantial assets.”85 
Somewhere in between Professor Stein’s and Ms. Peddie’s expansive 
interpretations and Professor Hoffheimer’s and Mr. Feder’s narrow 
interpretations lies Professor Charles Rhodes’ theory. He believes that a 
corporation may be subject to general jurisdiction in places other than the 
 
80. Feder, supra note 15, at 677. In drawing this conclusion, Mr. Feder focused on the Court’s 
comparison of “the ‘paradigm’ forum for general jurisdiction over a corporation with an individual’s home 
state,” id. (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853–54 (2011)), the 
Court’s reliance on a secondary source in which the author “‘identif[ied] domicile, place of incorporation, and 
principal place of business as paradig[m] bases for the exercise of general jurisdiction,’” id. (quoting Goodyear, 
131 S. Ct. at 2854), and the Court’s reference to Perkins as “the ‘textbook case of general jurisdiction,’” id. 
(quoting Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856). Other commentators have expressed this narrow view of Goodyear, as 
well. See Stephen B. Burbank, International Civil Litigation in U.S. Courts: Becoming a Paper Tiger?, 33 U. 
PA. J. INT’L L. 663, 670 (2012) (stating that Goodyear “may require that a corporation either be incorporated or 
have its principal place of business in the forum”); James R. Pielemeier, Goodyear Dunlop: A Welcome 
Refinement of the Language of General Personal Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 969, 990 (2012) 
(noting that the Goodyear Court “arguably suggested” that a corporate defendant will be “‘at home’” only in its 
state of incorporation and principal place of business) (citation omitted). 
81. See Hoffheimer, supra note 20, at 581–82 (“Under [a] broader reading, the Court disfavors general 
jurisdiction over corporations and restricts such jurisdiction to those states in which corporations were 
traditionally subject to general jurisdiction—the state of incorporation and the principal place of business.”). In 
identifying this possible interpretation, Professor Hoffheimer focuses on the Court’s references to International 
Shoe and Perkins. See id. at 584–85. 
82. Id. at 587. 
83. Id. at 592; see also Lem E. Montgomery III & Fred E. (Trey) Bourn III, Why Expansion of 
Commerce and Trade Does Not Expand the Reach of the Courts, 52 FOR THE DEF., NOV. 2011, at 42, 87 
(“While the [Goodyear] decision did not define ‘at home,’ a defendant’s state of incorporation and principal 
place of business may be the only states where general jurisdiction can be guaranteed. At a minimum, general 
jurisdiction will now require a significant business presence in the forum state.”). 
84. Hoffheimer, supra note 20, at 595. 
85. Id. at 602–03. In an article released just prior to this Article going to press, Professor Carol Andrews 
argues for an interpretation of Goodyear that is similar to Professor Hoffheimer’s interpretation. See Carol 
Andrews, Another Look at General Personal Jurisdiction, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 999, 1059, 1061–62 
(2012). Professor Andrews believes that only “incorporation and principal place of business are proper bases for 
general jurisdiction” under Goodyear, id. at 1059, but that, “in rare cases,” a corporation might have more than 
one principal place of business based on business activities, id. at 1062. 
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location of its principal place of business and state of incorporation,86 but that 
general jurisdiction “necessitates, at the very minimum, that the nonresident 
corporation act similarly to a local domiciliary by directing, controlling, and 
coordinating its operations on a continuous basis from the forum state.”87  
As is evident from this brief overview of the literature, the Goodyear Court 
spurred a burst of activity from the legal community. Academics and 
practitioners have attempted to interpret the Court’s “essentially at home” 
language, producing a wide range of tests in the process.88 However, the problem 
with each of the above interpretations and proposed tests is that they either fail to 
strictly comply with all of the Court’s language in light of existing precedent, or 
they run contrary to the interests and goals inherent in due process considerations 
(i.e., fairness, reasonableness, and predictability for the defendant) and 
jurisdictional analyses (simplicity and administrative efficiency). 
III. EXAMINING THE “PRECEDENT”: HERTZ AND THE “PRINCIPAL PLACE OF 
BUSINESS” TEST 
The questions left open in Goodyear are significant. And, looking at the 
Supreme Court’s track record in addressing general personal jurisdiction, chances 
are that it will not speak to this issue again for some time. However, the Court 
did tackle a relatively similar issue in the not-so-distant past: the location of a 
corporation’s principal place of business for purposes of diversity subject matter 
jurisdiction.89 
“Subject matter jurisdiction” concerns a court’s ability to adjudicate a case 
based on the nature of the controversy.90 Thus, in addition to the requirement that 
a court have personal jurisdiction over a defendant, as discussed above, a party’s 
 
86. Rhodes, Nineteenth Century, supra note 23, at 426. 
87. Id. at 433. Professor Rhodes bases the requirement for maintaining some sort of locus of control in 
the forum state on the Court’s opinion in Hertz Corp. v. Friend, in which it defined a corporation’s “principal 
place of business” for purposes of diversity subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 429 n.258; infra Part III. He 
notes that “the key attribute of a corporation’s ‘home’ in other legal contexts [including subject matter 
jurisdiction] is whether it directs and manages the majority of its business operations from [a particular] state.” 
Rhodes, Nineteenth Century supra note 23 at 428 (emphasis added). Therefore, Professor Rhodes contends, 
because the Goodyear Court softened the “home” language with modifiers like “essentially” and “fairly 
regarded as,” it is possible that multiple states may exercise general jurisdiction over a given corporation. See 
id. at 428–29. 
88. See supra Part II.C.  
89. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1192 (2010). 
90. See, e.g., Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction’s Noble Lie, 61 STAN. L. REV. 971, 987 (2009) (“[Subject 
matter jurisdiction] asks whether a particular court has the authority to resolve a particular type of suit. . . . It 
depends . . . on substantive law, party citizenship, and the basis of the litigants’ claims.”) (citation omitted); 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 870 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “subject-matter jurisdiction” as “[j]urisdiction over the 
nature of the case and the type of relief sought; the extent to which a court can rule on the conduct of persons or 
the status of things”); 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 3522 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing over which types of cases state and federal courts have subject matter 
jurisdiction)[hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER]. 
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ability to hale a defendant into court requires that the court have subject matter 
jurisdiction over the case.91 Federal courts have limited subject matter 
jurisdiction92 and, generally speaking, can hear cases involving a question of 
federal law and cases between citizens of different states (even if those cases 
involve only questions of state law)93. The latter type of subject matter 
jurisdiction is called “diversity jurisdiction.”94 While an individual’s citizenship is 
relatively easy to ascertain, the question of how to determine a corporation’s 
citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction was debated from the outset and 
continued until 2010 when the Court issued its unanimous opinion in Hertz Corp. 
v. Friend.95 
A. Corporate Citizenship and the Pre-Hertz “Principal Place of Business” 
Tests 
The Supreme Court began dealing with questions of corporate citizenship as 
early as 1809.96 Because corporations were considered “‘intangible’” and 
 
91. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 90, § 3522.  
It is a principle of first importance that the federal courts are tribunals of limited subject matter 
jurisdiction. . . . . They are empowered to hear only those cases that (1) are within the judicial power 
of the United States, as defined in the Constitution, and (2) that have been entrusted to them by a 
jurisdictional grant by Congress. A federal court’s entertaining a case that is not within its subject 
matter jurisdiction is no mere technical violation; it is nothing less than an unconstitutional 
usurpation of state judicial power. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
92. Id. 
93. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the 
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all 
Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and 
maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to 
Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—
between Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under 
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or 
Subjects. 
Id.  
94. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 90, § 3602. Congress currently limits diversity jurisdiction to 
cases in which the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(a) (2012). The diversity of citizenship statute more fully outlines the parameters: 
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in 
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between— 
(1) citizens of different States; 
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state . . . ; 
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional 
parties; and 
(4) a foreign state . . . as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.  
Id. 
95. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010). 
96. See id. at 1188 (discussing Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61 (1809)). 
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“‘artificial,’”97 the Court found that a corporation should be deemed a citizen of 
the states of which its shareholders were citizens.98 In 1844, the Court simplified 
the test and held that a corporation was a citizen of its state of incorporation.99 
However, the rationale for allowing diversity jurisdiction in the first place was to 
provide a forum where out-of-state parties would not suffer from local 
prejudice,100 and it became clear that corporations were abusing the system.101 A 
corporation with substantial business activities in a given state (and which was, 
therefore, not likely to suffer prejudice in that state) was able to remove cases to 
federal court when sued by citizens of that state simply because it had been 
incorporated elsewhere.102 Thus, in order to reduce the burden on the federal 
courts and to better effectuate the intent behind diversity jurisdiction, Congress 
decided in 1958 that corporations should have dual citizenship103—i.e., 
corporations were deemed to be citizens of their state or states of incorporation 
and of the state in which their “principal place of business” was located.104 
 
97. Id. (quoting Deveaux, 5 Cranch at 86). 
98. See id. (citing Deveaux, 5 Cranch at 91–92) (“[In Deveaux,] the Court held that a corporation could 
invoke the federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction based on a pleading that the corporation’s shareholders were all 
citizens of a different State from the defendants, as ‘the term citizen ought to be understood as it is used in the 
constitution, and as it is used in other laws. That is, to describe the real persons who come into court, in this 
case, under their corporate name.’”). 
99. See id. (citing Louisville, C. & C.R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497 (1844)) (“[In Letson, the Court] held 
that a corporation was to be deemed an artificial person of the State by which it had been created, and its 
citizenship for jurisdictional purposes determined accordingly.”). 
100. See id. (citing S. REP. NO. 72-530, at 2, 4–7 (1932)) (stating that “diversity jurisdiction’s basic 
rationale [was] opening the federal courts’ doors to those who might otherwise suffer from local prejudice 
against out-of-state parties”); S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 4 (1958) (noting that diversity jurisdiction is meant to 
protect foreign parties “against the prejudices of local courts and local juries by making available to them the 
benefits and safeguards of the Federal courts”); GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING 
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.04, at 131 (4th ed. 2009) (“The traditional justification for diversity jurisdiction is that it 
protects out-of-state litigants from local bias.”). 
101. See Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1188 (citing S. REP. NO. 72-530, at 4) (“Through its choice of the State of 
incorporation, a corporation could manipulate federal-court jurisdiction, for example, opening the federal 
courts’ doors in a State where it conducted nearly all its business by filing incorporation papers elsewhere.”); S. 
REP. NO. 72-530, at 4 (“Since the Supreme Court has decided that a corporation is a citizen . . . it has become a 
common practice for corporations to be incorporated in one State while they do business in another. And there 
is no doubt but that it often occurs simply for the purpose of being able to have the advantage of choosing 
between two tribunals in case of litigation.”). 
102. Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1188; S. REP. NO. 72-530, at 4; S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 4, as reprinted in 1958 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3101–02. 
103. S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 3, as reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3101 (discussing the corporate 
dual citizenship requirement and stating that “it will ease the workload of our Federal courts by reducing the 
number of cases involving corporations which come into Federal district courts on the fictional premise that a 
diversity of citizenship exists”); see Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1188–90 (discussing the genesis of the corporate dual 
citizenship definition as including a belief by many members of Congress that corporations were manipulating 
federal diversity jurisdiction and a belief by federal judges that their dockets contained too many diversity 
cases). 
104. Pub. L. No. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415, 415 (1958) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332). In December 2011, 
after both Hertz and Goodyear were decided, Congress amended the definition of corporate citizenship in 
§ 1332 to provide that “a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of every State and foreign state by which it 
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Congress borrowed the “principal place of business” language from the 
Bankruptcy Act and anticipated that the lower courts would be guided by 
precedent interpreting that statute.105 At the time, however, courts had been 
applying two different tests in that context.106 As a result, the courts were left on 
their own to determine how to interpret “principal place of business” for purposes 
of diversity jurisdiction, and several tests surfaced.107 The Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals applied a “nerve center” test, which focused on the corporation’s 
managerial activities and under which a “corporation’s brain”—or the source of 
its decision-making, control, and direction—was considered to be its principal 
place of business.108 The Third Circuit applied the “corporate activities” test, 
which focused on the corporation’s production- and service-related activities and 
provided that a corporation’s principal place of business was where the majority 
of the corporation’s manufacturing facilities, sales centers, employees, and 
property were located.109 In addition, some courts utilized both the “nerve center” 
and “corporate activities” tests. For example, the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and 
Eleventh Circuits applied the “total activity” test, which combined the “nerve 
center” and “corporate activities” tests by considering the location of both the 
managerial and production- and service-related activities.110 The First, Second, 
Fourth, and Ninth Circuits kept both tests in their arsenal, applying one or the 
other based on certain presumptions.111 “Not surprisingly, different circuits (and 
 
has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business . . . .” 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (emphasis added); see Pub. L. No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 758, 758–59 (2011) (codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 1332). 
105. Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1189–90 (citations omitted); S. REP. NO. 72-530, at 5. 
106. Lindsey D. Saunders, Note, Determining a Corporation’s Principal Place of Business: A Uniform 
Approach to Diversity Jurisdiction, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1475, 1478 (2006) (“Around the time of the 1958 
amendment, courts used two tests to determine a corporation’s principal place of business under the Bankruptcy 
Act: the ‘home office’ test and the ‘actual place of operations’ test.”) (citing Note, A Corporation’s Principal 
Place of Business for Purposes of Diversity Jurisdiction, 44 MINN. L. REV. 308, 316 (1959)). 
107. See Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1190–92; Saunders, supra note 106, at 1478–79. This Section provides a 
very brief overview of the various “principal place of business” tests in use prior to the Court’s decision in 
Hertz. For a more thorough discussion of the tests, see Saunders, supra note 106, at 1479–86 and 13F CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3625 (3d ed. 2009). 
108. Wis. Knife Words v. Nat’l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1282 (7th Cir. 1986); see Saunders, 
supra note 106, at 1479 (citations omitted) (“The nerve center test considers a corporation’s principal place of 
business to be the place from which corporate decision making, policy making, control, and direction 
emanate. . . . Under this test, the corporation’s principal place of business will usually, if not always, be the state 
in which its executive headquarters are located.”). 
109. See Kelly v. U.S. Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850, 854 (3d Cir. 1960); Saunders, supra note 106, at 
1480–81 (citations omitted) (“Under the corporate activities test, a corporation is a citizen of the state where the 
majority of the corporation’s production and service activities are located.”). 
110.  Saunders, supra note 106, at 1481–82 (citing Teal Energy USA, Inc. v. GT, Inc., 369 F.3d 873, 
877 (5th Cir. 2004); Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 163 (6th Cir. 1993); Capitol Indem. Corp. v. 
Russellville Steel Co., 367 F.3d 831, 836 (8th Cir. 2004); Gadlin v. Sybron Int’l Corp., 222 F.3d 797, 799 (10th 
Cir. 2000); MacGinnitie v. Hobbs Group, LLC, 420 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2005)). 
111. Id. at 1484–86 (citing Diaz-Rodriguez v. Pep Boys Corp., 410 F.3d 56, 61 (1st Cir. 2005); R.G. 
Barry Corp. v. Mushroom Makers, Inc., 612 F.2d 651, 655 (2d Cir. 1979); Peterson v. Cooley, 142 F.3d 181, 
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sometimes different courts within a single circuit) . . . applied these highly 
general multifactor tests in different ways.”112 This lack of uniformity prompted 
the Supreme Court to take action. 
B.  Hertz and the “Nerve Center” Test 
On June 8, 2009, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hertz Corp. v. 
Friend to resolve the Circuit split regarding application of the diversity 
jurisdiction statute’s “principal place of business” language.113 In that case, two 
individual California citizens sued Hertz Corporation in California state court for 
violations of California state laws.114 Hertz sought to remove the case to federal 
court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.115 The federal district court applied the 
Ninth Circuit’s “principal place of business” test, which, in the case of a 
corporation with far-flung operations, considered the principal place of business 
to be the state in which the corporation had the greatest amount of business 
activities.116 Only if no state contained a “substantial predominance” of business 
activities would the court consider the corporation’s principal place of business 
to be the nerve center.117 Because Hertz admittedly had significantly more of each 
relevant business activity in California than in any other state, the district court 
found that Hertz was a citizen of California even though its corporate 
headquarters was located in New Jersey.118 Accordingly, the court remanded the 
 
184 (4th Cir. 1998); Tosco Corp. v. Cmtys. for a Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 495, 500 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
112. Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1191 (citation omitted). 
113. See id. at 1187; Mem. Granting Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hertz, 130 S. Ct. 1181 (No. 08-
1107); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, 8–9, Hertz, 130 S. Ct. 1181 (No. 08-1107) [hereinafter Petition for 
Writ. of Certiorari, Hertz].  
114. Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1186. The two individuals also sought relief on behalf of a class of California 
citizens. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand, Friend v. Hertz Corp., No. C-07-5222 MMC, 2008 
WL 7071465, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2008). 
117. Id. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California’s full articulation of the Ninth 
Circuit’s test was as follows: 
Where the majority of a corporation’s business activity does not take place in one state, the state in 
which the corporation’s business activity is “significantly larger than any other state in which the 
corporation conducts business” is the corporation’s principal place of business. In determining 
whether a corporation’s business activity “substantially predominates in a given state,” a district 
court must make a “comparison of that corporation’s business activity in the state at issue to its 
business activity in other individual states.” In making such comparison, the court “employs a 
number of factors,” including “the location of employees, tangible property, production activities, 
sources of income, and where sales take place.” If, however, “no state contains a substantial 
predominance of a corporation’s business activities,” the corporation’s principal place of business is 
its “nerve center,” which is “the state where the majority of its executive and administrative 
functions are performed.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
118. Id. at *2. 
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case to state court because there was no diversity of citizenship among the 
parties.119 
Hertz appealed the decision up to the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that a 
court cannot disregard the location of a corporation’s headquarters in determining 
its principal place of business for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.120 On 
February 23, 2010, the Court issued its seminal decision in Hertz, finally 
providing a uniform test for determining a corporation’s principal place of 
business.121 The Court held that “the phrase ‘principal place of business’ refers to 
the place where the corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and 
coordinate the corporation’s activities.”122 The Court used the lower federal 
courts’ terminology and referred to this location as a corporation’s “nerve 
center,” stating that “the ‘nerve center’ will typically be found at a corporation’s 
headquarters.”123 Therefore, Hertz’s principal place of business was located in 
New Jersey.124 
In rendering its decision, the Court “place[d] primary weight upon the need 
for judicial administration of a jurisdictional statute to remain as simple as 
possible.”125 Thus, in addition to the statutory language- and intent-based 
rationales the Court used to explain its decision,126 the Court emphasized the 
importance of administrative simplicity: 
[A]dministrative simplicity is a major virtue in a jurisdictional statute. 
Complex jurisdictional tests complicate a case, eating up time and money 
as the parties litigate, not the merits of their claims, but which court is the 
right court to decide those claims. . . . Judicial resources too are at stake. 
Courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-
matter jurisdiction exists, even when no party challenges it. So courts 
benefit from straightforward rules under which they can readily assure 
themselves of their power to hear a case.127 
The Court also highlighted the importance of predictability to corporations and 
plaintiffs alike—the former when making business decisions and the latter when 
 
119. Id. at *3. 
120. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hertz, supra note 113, at *i. 
121. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1185–86 (2010). 
122. Id. at 1186. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 1195. 
125. Id. at 1186. 
126. Id. at 1192 (quoting 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 495 (2d ed. 1989)) (reasoning that 
Congress’ use of the singular “place” in conjunction with the word “principal” “require[d] [the Court] to pick 
out [one] ‘main, prominent’ or ‘leading’ place”); id. at 1194 (stating that the gross income test discussed in the 
statute’s legislative history “offers a simplicity-related interpretative benchmark….”). 
127. Id. at 1193 (citations omitted). 
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deciding whether to bring a lawsuit in state court versus federal court.128 
According to the Court, the “nerve center” test provides administrative simplicity 
and predictability because it “suggests a single location” rather than considering 
business activities that often “lack a single principal place where they take 
place.”129 
Another important consideration acknowledged throughout the Court’s 
opinion is “the general purpose of diversity jurisdiction, i.e., an effort to find the 
State where a corporation is least likely to suffer out-of-state prejudice when it is 
sued in a local court.”130 The Court discussed this underlying goal as the genesis 
of the “principal place of business” language.131 After positing that the plethora of 
“principal place of business” tests reflected the difficulty the lower courts had in 
effectuating that objective,132 the Court indicated that the “nerve center” test 
should in most cases identify the state where the corporation will suffer the least 
prejudice.133 Thus, the Court ended a decades-long debate regarding an important 
jurisdictional question by focusing on efficiency, predictability, and fairness. 
IV. APPLYING THE “PRECEDENT”: USING HERTZ TO EXPLAIN GOODYEAR 
Until the confusion surrounding the Court’s new “essentially at home” 
standard is resolved, the lower courts will apply their own interpretations, leaving 
general jurisdiction in much the same condition as diversity jurisdiction was in 
pre-Hertz. Therefore, a more specific definition is needed, and, fortunately, Hertz 
can help. While Hertz certainly is not binding precedent on the issue of general 
personal jurisdiction, it should be used as persuasive evidence in deciphering the 
Court’s language in Goodyear.134 In both cases, the Court was presented with the 
same question: where are a corporation’s contacts so significant that it will not 
suffer from local prejudice if forced to defend against litigation in state court? In 
Hertz, the Court determined that location to be the corporation’s “nerve center.” 
 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 1193–94. 
130. Id. at 1192. 
131. Id. at 1188. 
132. Id. at 1192. 
133. See id. at 1194 (“We . . . recognize that the use of a ‘nerve center’ test may in some cases produce 
results that seem to cut against the basic rationale for 28 U.S.C. § 1332 . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
134. A quick Westlaw search reveals that, as of the end of April 2013, only three courts had discussed 
these two decisions in the same opinion. See Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 676 F.3d 774, 775, 778 n.4 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting); Global Tech. Int’l, Ltd. v. Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc., C/A No. 0:12-3041-
CMC, 2013 WL 1809773, at *1–2, *4 (D.S.C. Apr. 29, 2013); Hallal v. Vicis Capital Master Fund Ltd., Civ. 
Action No. 12-10166-NMG, 2013 WL 1192384, at *5 n.8, *8 (D. Mass. Feb. 25, 2013). In only one of those 
opinions did the court appear to link Hertz’s “principal place of business” test with Goodyear’s “general 
personal jurisdiction” test. See Global Tech. Int’l, Ltd., 2013 WL 1809773, at *4 (stating that a corporation’s 
filing of a form listing its executive offices in a given location was not sufficient to establish that location as the 
corporation’s principal place of business under Hertz, and so the exercise of general jurisdiction in that location 
was not appropriate under Goodyear) (citations omitted). 
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In Goodyear, the Court declared that location to be wherever the corporation is 
“essentially at home.” Because the reasoning behind the outcomes was so 
similar, the opinions should be reconciled. Doing so adds meaning to the Court’s 
express language and use of precedent in Goodyear and explains why the Court 
opted to announce such a seemingly vague test. Moreover, incorporating Hertz 
creates a general jurisdiction test that addresses both due process and judicial 
administration goals by producing fair, predictable, and reasonable results in a 
simple and administratively-efficient manner—something the Court surely 
intended. 
A.  Interpreting “Essentially at Home” to Make the Most Sense of the Particular 
Language Used by the Court in Light of Existing Precedent 
Many commentators have already thoroughly analyzed the Court’s language 
in Goodyear. As discussed above, some believe the Court meant to limit general 
jurisdiction to only a corporation’s state of incorporation and principal place of 
business.135 In addition to those locales, others believe the Court signaled 
permission for a corporate defendant to be haled into court in any state in which 
the corporation conducts substantial business activities136 or from which corporate 
officers issue some level of control over the enterprise.137 Those interpretations, 
however, do not fully comport with the Court’s express language, its references 
to secondary materials, its reliance on precedent, or its continual rejection of 
general jurisdiction (except in Perkins). Moreover, they do not align with the 
Court’s recent opinion in Hertz. Rather, the interpretation that best explains the 
Court’s “essentially at home” language, and makes the most sensible use of 
precedent, is that a corporation is subject to general jurisdiction in its state of 
incorporation and in the one state where its principal place of business, or nerve 
center, is located. In the event the corporation does not have a nerve center 
located within the United States, it is subject to general jurisdiction in the one 
state, if any, in which it has a pseudo-nerve center (à la Perkins).138 If there is no 
such state, the plaintiff must look to specific jurisdiction for recourse. 
 
135. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
136. See supra notes 70–79 and 86–87 and accompanying text. 
137. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text. 
138. Contra Taylor Simpson-Wood, In the Aftermath of Goodyear Dunlop: Oyez! Oyez! Oyez! A Call 
for a Hybrid Approach to Personal Jurisdiction in International Products Liability Controversies, 64 BAYLOR 
L. REV. 113, 154 (2012) (“[T]he Court’s . . . confinement of general personal jurisdiction to Perkinsesque 
scenarios . . . w[as] not pre-ordained by precedent.”) (citations omitted). 
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1.  A Corporation is “at Home” in Its State of Incorporation and in the 
State Where Its Nerve Center is Located 
The Court’s express language in Goodyear demonstrates its intent to allow 
for the operation of general jurisdiction over a corporation in a maximum of two 
states: its state of incorporation139 and the state in which it has its principal place 
of business.140 This intent is evident in the Court’s repeated use of the phrase “at 
home” to indicate the locations in which a corporation can properly be subject to 
general jurisdiction.141 For example, the Court equated the place in which a 
corporation can be “fairly regarded as at home” with an “individual’s domicile,” 
noting that those locations are the “paradigm forum[s] for the exercise of general 
jurisdiction.”142 Because it has long been recognized that a corporation is 
“domiciled” in its state of incorporation143 and in the state in which it has its 
principal place of business,144 the Court’s express “at home” language should be 
interpreted to refer only to those locations.145 
 
139. Corporations typically are incorporated in only one state. Brilmayer et al., supra note 23, at 735. 
However, there may be special instances in which a corporation will have more than one state of incorporation. 
See Hoffheimer, supra note 20, at 596. In those instances, the corporation is subject to general jurisdiction in 
each of those states. 
140. See, e.g., Feder, supra note 15, at 677 (noting that the Court hinted at limiting the exercise of 
general jurisdiction over a corporation to only its state of incorporation and the state housing its principal place 
of business). But see Peddie, supra note 7, at 713 (noting that “[the Court] could easily have restricted the place 
in which a court could exercise general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation to the state of the corporation’s 
principal place of business or incorporation,” but that it did not); id. at 720. 
141. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851, 2854, 2857 (2011). 
Professor Todd Peterson believes that Justice Ginsburg’s use of the “at home” phrase to describe general 
jurisdiction in McIntyre (the companion case to Goodyear) is also “strong[] evidence” of the Court’s “intent[] to 
restrict the applicability of general jurisdiction to a defendant’s state of incorporation or principal place of 
business.” Peterson, supra note 68, at 216 (citing J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2797 
(2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). However, Professor Peterson ultimately does not believe that is how the 
opinion should be interpreted. See id. at 216–17. 
142. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853–54. 
143. Hoffheimer, supra note 20, at 595. 
144. See Brilmayer et al., supra note 23, at 733 (“The law treats corporations like legal persons, and the 
place of incorporation and the principal place of business are both analogous to domicile.”); Twitchell, Myth, 
supra note 23, at 633 (“[G]eneral jurisdiction is almost always available at a defendant’s ‘home base.’ Courts 
routinely exercise jurisdiction over individual defendants who are forum domiciliaries or habitual residents, and 
over corporations where they are incorporated or where they have their principal place of business, without 
regard to the nature of the cause of action.”). The Court itself said as much in McIntyre, the companion case to 
Goodyear: “Citizenship or domicile—or, by analogy, incorporation or principal place of business for 
corporations—also indicates general submission to a State’s powers.” McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787 (citing 
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2854) (emphasis added). Over forty years ago, Professors von Mehren and Trautman 
actually defined a corporation’s domicile as its state of incorporation and nerve center: 
From the beginning in American practice, general adjudicatory jurisdiction over corporations and 
other legal persons could be exercised by the community with which the legal person had its closest 
and most continuing legal and factual connections. The community that chartered the corporation 
and in which it has its head office occupies a position somewhat analogous to that of the community 
of a natural person’s domicile and habitual residence. If a corporation’s managerial and 
administrative center is in a state other than its state of incorporation, presumably general 
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The Court’s references to scholarly works also speak volumes about the 
Court’s intent.146 For example, the Court relied on a seminal general jurisdiction 
article authored by Professor Lea Brilmayer for the proposition that a corporation 
is located “at home” in its “place of incorporation” and “principal place of 
business.”147 In doing so, the Court described Professor Brilmayer’s article as 
“identifying domicile, place of incorporation, and principal place of business as 
‘paradig[m]’ bases for the exercise of general jurisdiction.”148 This is, 
presumably, where the Court obtained the “paradigm” language it used in 
describing the “at home” test.149 Because the U.S. Supreme Court cites to journal 
articles in less than one-third of its opinions150 (and is even less likely to do so 
when the issue is not one of first impression151), the inclusion of this definition is 
particularly meaningful. 
The Court’s intended interpretation of the phrase “principal place of 
business” is equally apparent in the Court’s express language and choice of 
source materials. It is—or should be—safe to assume that by using a legal term 
of art the Court meant for it to be given its legal definition. Therefore, because 
the Court recently decided in Hertz that a corporation’s principal place of 
business is not to be determined by the location of its corporate activities or 
physical property, but rather that the principal place of business is the one place 
from which “the corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and coordinate 
the corporation’s activities,”152 the phrase should be interpreted the same in this 
context.153 Although further explanation of this clear term of art was unnecessary, 
 
jurisdiction should exist in either community. 
von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at 1141–42; see also Twitchell, Myth, supra note 23, at 669 (“Because 
a corporation’s headquarters is the functional equivalent of an individual defendant’s domicile, home base 
jurisdiction should be available wherever the corporation is headquartered.”). 
145. Cf. Hoffheimer, supra note 20, at 585 (“The Court’s opinion identifies two places where a 
corporation will be ‘at home’ and, thus, subject to general jurisdiction: the place of incorporation and the 
principal place of business.”). 
146. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853–56.  
147. Id. at 2854 (citing Brilmayer et al., supra note 23, at 728). 
148. Id. (quoting Brilmayer et al., supra note 23, at 728). 
149. See id. at 2853–54.  
150. Whit D. Pierce & Anne E. Reuben, The Law Review is Dead; Long Live the Law Review: A Closer 
Look at the Declining Judicial Citation of Legal Scholarship, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1185, 1203 tbl.6, 1206 
(2010) (showing that the U.S. Supreme Court cited to a “law review” article, a “law journal” article, or both in 
31.4% of its opinions between 2005 and 2009). 
151. See id. at 1206 (“[T]he Court is generally more likely to cite a legal journal in a case in which it 
mentions the words ‘first impression.’”). 
152. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1186 (2010). 
153. Cf. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 34 (2005) (“[T]he normal rule of statutory construction [is] 
that identical words used in different parts of the same statute are generally presumed to have the same 
meaning.”). Professor Andrews also recently suggested that the Hertz “nerve center” test can be used to identify 
a corporation’s principal place of business for purposes of general jurisdiction. See Andrews, supra note 85, at 
1060 (“The state of a corporation’s principal place of business—at least as currently defined by the Court for 
purposes of subject matter jurisdiction—also passes the Goodyear at-home test.”). She contends that, “in every 
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the Court did reiterate that “‘continuous activity of some sorts’” is insufficient to 
confer general jurisdiction.154 And, notably, Professor Brilmayer—in the very 
article relied upon by the Goodyear Court when defining the “paradigm bases” of 
general jurisdiction—explicitly rejected “activities” as a “paradigm bas[i]s of 
general jurisdiction.”155 Thus, gone are the days when a corporation could be 
haled into court based on “doing-business” factors such as the amount of sales, 
warehouses, factories, or employees it has in a given state.156 
The Court’s repeated reliance on yet another pivotal personal jurisdiction 
article157 (this one authored by Professors Arthur T. von Mehren and Donald T. 
Trautman), coupled with its reference to International Shoe as the “canonical 
opinion” in personal jurisdiction jurisprudence,158 provides further support for 
both of the above propositions (i.e., that “at home” for a corporation means its 
state of incorporation and principal place of business, and that “principal place of 
business” means nerve center). In laying the groundwork for its decision in 
Goodyear, the Court used Professor von Mehren’s and Professor Trautman’s 
article to help define the contours of specific and general jurisdiction.159 The 
Court then referenced the article for further reading.160 Within the pages cited by 
the Court is this statement: 
Th[e] approach [in International Shoe] suggests that, absent the kind of 
total, close, and continuing relations to a community implied in 
incorporation or in the location of a head office within a state, 
jurisdiction over legal persons—aside perhaps from the possibility of 
 
case, the state of a corporation’s nerve center under Hertz also should qualify as the corporation’s home” under 
Goodyear. Id. at 1060–61. However, according to Professor Andrews, the nerve center is not the only 
permissible location of a corporation’s principal place of business under the Goodyear test: “In cases where the 
vast bulk of operations are in a single state other than the nerve center, the corporation might be at home in two 
states—the nerve center and the operations state.” Id. at 1061. 
154. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856 (quoting Int’l Shoe Corp. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945)). 
155. Brilmayer et al., supra note 23, at 735. Professor Brilmayer did, however, still believe that general 
jurisdiction could be asserted based on a corporation having a significant amount of activities in the forum state. 
See id. at 735–36 (“A defendant’s activities in the forum can be the basis for either general or specific 
jurisdiction . . . . The type of jurisdiction being asserted sets the quantum of contacts required; . . . general 
jurisdiction requires proof of continuous and systematic activities.”). 
156. See, e.g., Feder, supra note 15, at 680 (quoting Twitchell, Doing Business, supra note 44, at 173) 
(stating that Goodyear significantly narrows the scope of general jurisdiction and should be interpreted to end 
the notion of “doing business” jurisdiction, which made “general jurisdiction . . . available in any state in which 
the defendant ha[d] ‘regular and consistent commercial activities’”); Rhodes, Nineteenth Century, supra note 
23, at 430 (“[T]he [Goodyear] Court undoubtedly rejected the reasoning of many lower court decisions that 
doing some quantum of business with forum residents alone sufficed for the defendant’s amenability to any 
cause of action.”); Pielemeier, supra note 80, at 989 (“One fairly clear consequence of [Goodyear] is that 
general jurisdiction based on regular sales in the forum is clearly dead.”). 
157. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14. 
158. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853. 
159. See id. at 2851 (citing von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at 1136). 
160. See id. at 2853 (citing von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at 1144–63). 
_02_BLANCHARD_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2014 9:39 AM 
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 44 
889 
limited general jurisdiction based on the location of assets—should take 
the form of specific jurisdiction.161 
In other words, scholars so respected by the Court as to earn multiple citations in 
a mere nine-page opinion interpreted the decision the Court deemed “canonical” 
to mean that general jurisdiction is usually only appropriate in a corporation’s 
state of incorporation and where its headquarters is located. Based on this myriad 
of evidence, it is apparent the Goodyear Court also was referring to those two 
locations when it used the phrase “at home.” 
2.  “Essentially” Creates a Cushion for Exercising General Jurisdiction over 
Foreign-Country Corporations 
Thus far in the analysis, it is evident that the Court, through the “at home” 
language, has retained the longstanding notion that a corporation is subject to 
general jurisdiction in the states in which it is incorporated and has its principal 
place of business.162 Based on the Court’s earlier opinion in Hertz, it is also clear 
that a corporation’s sole principal place of business is its nerve center, or locus of 
decision-making. What is less clear is what the Goodyear Court meant by 
“essentially.”163 Certainly, a purely “state of incorporation and principal place of 
business” test would have been clear and easy to articulate. For example, “[a] 
corporation is subject to general jurisdiction in the state in which it is 
incorporated and in the state in which it has its principal place of business.” Or, 
“a corporation is subject to general jurisdiction in the states in which it is at 
home.” Instead, however, the Court coined a new phrase (“essentially at 
home”),164 signaling its adoption of something more.  
The something more implied by the Court’s use of “essentially” is the 
Court’s allowance for a cushion in order to permit a court’s exercise of general 
jurisdiction over foreign-country corporations that do not have a principal place 
of business located within the United States. Again, this interpretation is fully 
explained by the Court’s language and references to precedent. The Court 
mandates consideration of the foreign corporation’s “affiliations with the State” 
in order to determine whether the corporation is “essentially at home in the forum 
State.”165 Using “State,” with a capital “S,” shows that the Court is referring only 
to affiliations with the fifty states within the United States and the United States’ 
 
161. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at 1144. 
162. The Court did not explicitly state this rule, perhaps taking it as a given, or perhaps because the 
determination of when it is appropriate to exercise general jurisdiction over a domestic corporation with a 
principal place of business located within the United States was not before the Court. 
163. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.  
164. Id.  
165. Id. (citing Int’l Shoe Corp. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)) (emphasis added). 
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Territories, not to affiliations with foreign-country states.166 However, the test 
addresses both “sister-state” (or domestic) foreign corporations and “foreign-
country” foreign corporations, and foreign-country corporations almost always 
will have their headquarters located outside of the United States. Therefore, 
foreign-country corporations rarely will be “at home” within the United States. 167  
Enter Perkins and the term “essentially.” By referring to Perkins as “‘[t]he 
textbook case’” of the appropriate exercise of general jurisdiction over a foreign 
corporation,168 the Goodyear Court acknowledged that there may be instances in 
which a corporation whose principal place of business is abroad nevertheless has 
contacts with a forum within the United States that are comparable to having a 
principal place of business in the United States—i.e., a temporary or pseudo-
headquarters. In those—and only those—instances, the foreign corporation might 
not be “at home” in the forum state, but it is “essentially at home.”169 
This is not to say that foreign-country corporations will always have a 
location within the United States in which they are essentially at home.170 Nor 
 
166. See Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, 543 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The term ‘State’ with a 
capital ‘S’ refers only to the fifty states, Territories, District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, but not to foreign 
states, which are referred to with a lowercase ‘s.’”). 
167. See Burbank, supra note 80, at 671 (“[A] domestic corporation . . . will always have at least one 
‘home’ in the United States, [but] a foreign corporation . . . usually will not.”) (citation omitted). Even domestic 
corporations sometimes have their principal place of business located outside of the United States. See, e.g., 
Torres, 113 F.3d at 543 (stating that the defendant corporation was incorporated in Delaware but had its 
principal place of business in Peru). However, domestic corporations will be, at the very least, incorporated 
within the United States and, therefore, subject to general jurisdiction in at least one place under the proposed 
interpretation of “essentially at home.” 
168. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856 (quoting Donahue v. Far E. Air Transp. Corp., 652 F.2d 1032, 1037 
(D.C. Cir. 1981)). 
169. See Stein, Meaning, supra note 7, at 531–32 (“[Justice Ginsburg] doesn’t say that [being “at 
home”] is the only circumstance in which general jurisdiction is permitted, but that is the clear implication. In 
other words, that level of activity is not simply sufficient, it is necessary.”); Rhodes, Predictability Principle, 
supra note 13, at 227 (“[T]he nature of the defendant’s forum operations should indicate activities at least 
analogous to the types of in-state activities that define a corporation’s principal place of business.”); Feder, 
supra note 15, at 694 (“While the Court’s use of ‘at home’ rather than merely ‘home’—and its softening of the 
phrase to ‘essentially at home’ on one occasion—may suggest a degree of wiggle room, the Court’s definition 
of the ‘paradigm’ as state of incorporation and principal place of business makes it hard to imagine that the 
standard can be stretched to include states where the corporation has only a relatively small presence.”) 
(citations omitted); id. at 694 n.117 (“The ‘essentially at home’ phrasing might . . . have been intended to 
accommodate the facts of Perkins, in which the forum state was only temporarily the defendant’s principal 
place of business.”) (citation omitted); see also Pielemeier, supra note 80, at 991 (“Perhaps for [companies 
based in foreign countries], the test should be refined to finding a place where they are ‘at home’ in the United 
States.”). One indicator that the Court would have described the defendant in Perkins as “essentially at home” 
in Ohio rather than “at home,” is the language it used in applying Perkins to the facts in Goodyear: “Unlike the 
defendant in Perkins, whose sole wartime business activity was conducted in Ohio, petitioners are in no sense at 
home in North Carolina.” Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857 (emphasis added). Had the Court stated that, unlike the 
defendant in Perkins, the Goodyear petitioners were “not at home,” the Court would have implied that the facts 
in Perkins were sufficient to render a corporation “at home.” Instead, the Court chose to say that, unlike the 
defendant in Perkins, the Goodyear petitioners were “in no sense at home,” thereby implying that the defendant 
in Perkins was only in a sense—or “essentially”—at home in Ohio. 
170. Cf. Condlin, supra note 23, at 97 (“[T]o support general jurisdiction [in Helicopteros] they would 
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should that be the case. As noted by Professor Rhodes, “[a]ll-purpose 
adjudicative authority over a foreign[-country] corporation by American courts 
should be reserved for rare cases, thereby preventing adjudicative regulation of 
controversies that have little or no relationship to American interests.”171 The 
Court’s reliance on Helicopteros and, indeed, the result it reached in Goodyear, 
support this position. In both cases, the Court denied the exercise of general 
jurisdiction over a foreign-country corporation in the only forum within the 
United States in which it could plausibly be sued.172 Thus, “[a] plaintiff can 
always pursue a defendant in the defendant’s home forum and, in most cases, can 
proceed where the claim arose”; 173 the fact that those locations might be located 
outside of the United States may just be tough luck for the plaintiff.174 
Based on this analysis of the Court’s opinion and application of precedent, it 
is evident that the proposed tests discussed in Part II.C. are unsuitable. In direct 
contradiction to the Court’s precedent in Hertz, Professor Stein’s, Professor 
Hoffheimer’s, and Ms. Peddie’s proposed tests all require consideration of 
numerous business activity-related factors, such as sales, employees, and 
facilities. And, Professor Rhodes’ interpretation allows for the assertion of 
general jurisdiction at multiple administrative offices rather than one principal 
“place” of business. Finally, Mr. Feder’s reading overlooks the Court’s express 
broadening of the “at home” phrase by use of the word “essentially.” Therefore, 
 
have to show that Helicol had substantial contacts with Texas, and this was nearly impossible to do for a 
company that was incorporated, and had its principal place of business, in Colombia, South America.”); Angus, 
supra note 23, at 65 (noting that narrowing the exercise of general jurisdiction to the state of incorporation and 
principal place of business could result in “foreign defendant[s] . . . escap[ing] liability within the United States 
entirely”). 
171. Rhodes, Nineteenth Century, supra note 23, at 430. If the claim arose in the United States, then 
presumably there would be a relationship between the controversy and the forum state such that an exercise of 
specific jurisdiction would be appropriate. Although, whether a plaintiff will be able to pursue a cause of action 
against a foreign-country defendant in the state where the claim arose certainly has been called into question by 
the Supreme Court’s strict interpretation of specific jurisdiction in McIntyre. 
172. See Louise Weinberg, The Helicopter Case and the Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction, 58 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 913, 916 (1985) (citing Brief for Respondents at 9, 18, Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 
466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984)) (“Helicol was amenable to suit in no state if not in Texas; the alternative would 
have been a foreign country.”); Angus, supra note 23, at 79–80 (“[I]n deciding that the defendant in 
Helicopteros was not subject to general jurisdiction in Texas, the Supreme Court essentially ruled that the 
defendant was not subject to any liability in Texas or anywhere else in the United States because Texas was the 
only possible forum in which the plaintiffs could bring suit.”); Stein, Meaning, supra note 7, at 542 (“[T]he 
plaintiffs in Goodyear Dunlop were forced to pursue their remedies for the injuries suffered in France in a 
French Court.”). 
173. Stein, Meaning, supra note 7, at 528. 
174. Because of this perceived unfairness to American plaintiffs, some commentators have advocated 
for a more lenient standard when it comes to forum residents suing foreign-country defendants. See id. at 541 
(citing Linda J. Silberman, Comparative Jurisdiction in the International Context: Will the Proposed Hague 
Judgment Convention Be Stalled?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 319, 340–41 (2003); Twitchell, Doing Business, supra 
note 44, at 209–10)) (“Some scholars, notably Linda Silberman and Mary Twitchell, have suggested that 
providing general jurisdiction to resident plaintiffs based on a pervasive contacts approach would provide 
plaintiffs with an assured domestic remedy . . . .”). 
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the lower courts should apply the reasoning proposed in this Article and interpret 
“essentially at home” to mean a corporation’s state of incorporation and the one 
state in which the corporation’s nerve center (or, pseudo-nerve center in the case 
of a foreign-country corporation) is located. 
B.  Interpreting “Essentially at Home” to Address Important Due Process and 
Administrative Goals 
As noted by Professor Stein, placing a significant limitation on the exercise 
of general jurisdiction—such as the one proposed in this Article—would not only 
comport with the views held by many commentators in the legal community,175 
but it would also more closely align the United States with generally accepted 
international standards.176 Most importantly, however, use of the Hertz “nerve 
center” test to elucidate the “essentially at home” standard in the proposed 
manner satisfies the U.S. Constitution’s due process requirements and furthers 
the judicial system’s goals.177 First, the proposed explanation promotes fairness 
 
175. Stein, Meaning, supra note 7, at 532 (stating that constraining general jurisdiction “aligns the Court 
with many academic commentators . . . who have advocated limiting significantly the operation of general 
jurisdiction”) (citations omitted). Some of these views have been held for decades. See, e.g., Allan R. Stein, 
Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 758 
(1987) (arguing that general jurisdiction may be exercised only over defendants who have “adopted the forum 
as [their] own”); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at 1178–79 (“[G]eneral jurisdiction based on 
presence, which often produces unfair results . . . , should disappear. It is, of course, appropriate to preserve 
some place where the defendant can be sued on any cause of action. But we submit that only the common arena 
of the defendant’s activities should be such a place. . . . [F]or a corporation, it is the corporate headquarters—
presumably both the place of incorporation and the principal place of business, where these differ.”). Others are 
newly-expressed interpretations of Goodyear. See, e.g., Feder, supra note 15, at 695 (“Goodyear’s addition of a 
new ‘at home’ requirement to the general jurisdiction inquiry . . . significantly, and rightly, undermines the 
lower court case law that has accepted (but never justified) doing business in a state as a sufficient basis for 
general jurisdiction.”); Hoffheimer, supra note 20, at 592 (“[A] fair reading of the opinion leaves little doubt 
that circumstances giving rise to general jurisdiction will be unusual.”). 
176. Stein, Meaning, supra note 7, at 532–33 (stating that significantly limiting general jurisdiction is 
“consistent with international consensus,” such as Article 2 of the European Regulation on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments, as well as the draft Hague Convention on International 
Enforcement of Judgments, which permit general jurisdiction only in the state of domicile and prohibit general 
jurisdiction based on doing business in the forum, respectively) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Silberman, supra 
note 69, at 607–11, 613–14 (discussing the differences between jurisdictional standards in the United States and 
abroad); Allan R. Stein, Frontiers of Jurisdiction: From Isolation to Connectedness, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
373, 387 (2001) [hereinafter Stein, Frontiers] (“[T]he pervasive contacts approach has been fairly universally 
condemned outside of the United States . . . .”); Rhodes, Nineteenth Century, supra note 23, at 430 (citing 
Friedrich K. Juenger, The American Law of General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141 (2001), 162) 
(noting that a “confined scope of general jurisdiction approaches international norms, as many other nations 
abhor an expansive conception of general jurisdiction”). 
177. But see Hoffheimer, supra note 20, at 598–99 (citing SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 100, 
at 34) (stating that “it is questionable whether the principal place of business should be defined the same way 
for both subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction,” and that, while “[t]he [nerve-center] test may . . . 
provide one constitutionally appropriate method for determining general jurisdiction[,] . . . . courts may have 
good reasons for rejecting the nerve-center test as a particularly inappropriate guide for identifying a 
corporation’s principal place of business for purposes of personal jurisdiction”); SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, 
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and predictability for the defendant, while incorporating the notion of “fair play 
and substantial justice” that has long been a part of personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence. Second, the proposed explanation promotes simplicity and 
administrative efficiency, two important attributes of a jurisdictional test. 
1.  Promoting Fairness, Predictability, and Reasonableness 
The ultimate concern in the due process analysis is protection of the 
defendant’s liberty interests, or, in other words, ensuring “fairness” to the 
defendant.178 Whether it is fair to hale a defendant into court in a given state—to 
defend against a claim completely unrelated to the defendant’s activities there—
is primarily determined by examining the defendant’s relationship with that 
state.179 The question becomes whether the “defendant [is] sufficiently present 
 
supra note 98, at 34 (citing Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 
(1982)) (“It would be tempting to resolve personal jurisdiction issues by reference to [diversity subject matter 
jurisdiction] case law, but this is probably unwise. The due process law of personal jurisdiction and the law of 
federal subject matter jurisdiction are grounded on fundamentally different policies. It may be best to apply the 
home-state principle of personal jurisdiction to corporations only where the forum is the place of incorporation 
or where the activities of the corporation are clearly concentrated.”). 
178. See Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd., 456 U.S. at 702 (“The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes 
and protects an individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of 
sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty.”) (citations omitted); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 
S. Ct. 2780, 2800 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The modern approach to jurisdiction over corporations and 
other legal entities, ushered in by International Shoe, gave prime place to reason and fairness.”); Brilmayer et 
al., supra note 23, at 766 (citing Int’l Shoe Corp. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)) (“Fairness, not 
simply foreseeability of suit or state interest, is the most important consideration for general jurisdiction.”); 
Condlin, supra note 23, at 68 (“[P]arties should not be forced to defend in forums where they will not be treated 
fairly. The Due Process Clause demands as much.”). The due process protections also apply to foreign-country 
corporate defendants. See Silberman, supra note 69, at 595 (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of 
Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113 & n.*, 114–15 (1987)) (“One fundamental question in the United States is whether a 
foreign defendant can even invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court has answered 
that question ‘yes,’ at least as regards private defendants.”). But see John N. Drobak, Personal Jurisdiction in a 
Global World: A Comment on the Supreme Court’s Recent Decisions in Goodyear Dunlop Tires and Nicastro, 
90 WASH. U. L. REV. ___, ___ (forthcoming 2013) (“Although the Court has applied the same jurisdictional 
rules to non-resident foreign nationals as it does to U.S. citizens, and no parties have argued otherwise, it is time 
for the Court to apply its due process precedent to issues of personal jurisdiction and rule that non-citizens lack 
the constitutional protections available to citizens.”); id. at ___ (“[T]he due process clause provides absolutely 
no protection to defendants like the ones in Goodyear and Nicastro.”). 
179. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text; Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) 
(“[T]he relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, rather than the mutually exclusive 
sovereignty of the States on which the rules of Pennoyer rest, [are] the central concern of the inquiry into 
personal jurisdiction.”); Condlin, supra note 23, at 66 (“[T]he defining feature of the doctrine [of general 
jurisdiction is] that a party can be sued for anything without the plaintiff having to show a relationship between 
the claim and the forum. Only the defendant’s relationship with the forum is relevant. This much is 
uncontroversial.”) (citations omitted); Silberman, supra note 69, at 607 (“In the United States, it is the 
affiliation between the defendant and the forum that is critical, and this is true for the interstate as well as the 
transnational case. Whether the values reflected are those about sovereignty and consent to authority or the 
sense of a fundamental principle of what is fair, remains clouded after the two recent Supreme Court 
decisions.”). 
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that it is reasonable to expect that [the defendant] will be treated fairly by local 
courts and juries.”180 
The answer to that question is “yes” under the interpretation of “essentially at 
home” proposed in this Article. Certainly, a defendant’s relationship with its state 
of incorporation is strong enough to support the exercise of general jurisdiction.181 
It is by virtue of that state’s laws that the corporation exists, and the corporation 
is perpetually present there.182 Moreover, personal jurisdiction can be waived183; 
therefore, the corporation’s decision to incorporate in a given state should be 
seen as voluntary consent to general jurisdiction in that forum.184 Thus, it can 
hardly be deemed unfair to a corporation to hale it into court in its state of 
incorporation. 
Likewise, it is fair to hale the corporation into court in the state where its 
headquarters (or something akin to a corporate headquarters) is located. After all, 
the corporation has chosen to concentrate the direction, control, and coordination 
of its activities and policies in that state.185 Unlike a state in which the corporation 
merely does business, the state housing its corporate headquarters is the location 
from which the corporation makes all of its major corporate-life decisions.186 
 
180. Condlin, supra note 23, at 68 (“Since general jurisdiction presupposes the lack of a relationship 
between the forum and the plaintiff’s claim, it follows that it should be available only in states where defendants 
are sufficiently present that it is reasonable to expect that they will be treated fairly by local courts and juries.”); 
see Stein, Meaning, supra note 7, at 543 (discussing the issues as whether “others [would] perceive [the 
defendant] as a member of their community” such that the defendant “will be treated as fairly [t]here as 
anywhere else.”). 
181. See Brilmayer et al., supra note 23, at 733–34 (discussing reasons why it is proper to exercise 
general jurisdiction over a corporation in its state of incorporation); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at 
1141 (“The community that chartered the corporation . . . occupies a position somewhat analogous to that of the 
community of a natural person’s domicile and habitual residence” and can, therefore, exercise general 
jurisdiction over the corporation.). But see Twitchell, Myth, supra note 20, at 669–70 (“Although the fact of 
incorporation under state law gives the forum state a valid interest in applying its own laws to any suit involving 
the internal affairs of the corporation, a strong argument can be made that the automatic exercise of ‘pure’ 
general jurisdiction over a domestic corporation is inappropriate when so many corporations lack any other 
significant ties with their state of incorporation.”) (citations omitted). 
182. See Brilmayer et al., supra note 23, at 733 (noting that a corporation “cannot ever be absent from 
the state of incorporation”). 
183. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd., 456 U.S. at 703. 
184. See Stein, Meaning, supra note 7, at 547 (“[A] defendant can volitionally submit to the authority of 
a state . . . [, so] it is appropriate to subject a defendant to general jurisdiction in its state (or states) of 
incorporation . . . . [because its] choice of incorporation in a particular state is entirely voluntary and involves 
continuing responsibility to and regulatory governance by the state.”); Brilmayer et al., supra note 23, at 733 
(“In some respects, the decision to incorporate in a particular state provides a more powerful basis for 
adjudicatory jurisdiction than does domicile [for an individual]. . . . [T]he corporation intentionally chooses to 
create a relationship with the state of incorporation, presumably to obtain the benefits of that state’s substantive 
and procedural laws. Such a choice creates a unique relationship that justifies general jurisdiction over the 
corporation.”). 
185. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1192 (2010) (stating that a place will only qualify as a 
“headquarters” for purposes of the principal place of business analysis if it “is the actual center of direction, 
control, and coordination . . . and not simply an office where the corporation holds its board meetings.”). 
186. See Twitchell, Myth, supra note 23, at 671–72 (“A defendant engaging in continuous and 
_02_BLANCHARD_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2014 9:39 AM 
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 44 
895 
Consequently, the corporation is acting like a local individual resident in every 
sense and will be treated as fairly in that state as it would be treated in any other 
state.187 The Court has already indicated its approval of this approach in Hertz. As 
discussed above, in narrowing the availability of diversity jurisdiction, Congress 
was similarly trying to determine in which state’s courts a corporate defendant 
would be least likely to suffer from local prejudice.188 Congress ultimately 
determined that state is wherever the entity’s principal place of business is 
located.189 In Hertz, the Supreme Court further defined that state as wherever the 
entity’s nerve center is located.190 
Closely related to the due process goal of fairness is predictability. While the 
primary concern here is that the defendant be able to predict where it can be 
subject to suit,191 it is also important that a plaintiff be able to accurately predict 
where a defendant can be forced to litigate.192 Limiting the “essentially at home” 
 
substantial economic activity within a forum shares some traits with insiders: it pays taxes, is subject to 
regulation, benefits from participation in the local economy, and has some power to influence local political 
processes. But unlike citizens or corporations based within the forum, it is often not ‘local’ in its own eyes or in 
the eyes of the community because its major economic ties are outside the boundaries of the state and it has 
strong ties to at least one other sovereign. Thus, it is not an ‘insider’—’one of us’—to the same degree as a 
purely local corporation or business.”) (citations omitted); Stein, Frontiers, supra note 176, at 382–83 (“While 
we have some sense that our ‘home’ state—our ‘king’—may have authority over us regardless of where we 
have acted, we do not owe the same universal allegiance to other states that we merely visit—even those we 
visit frequently or in which we may wield significant political influence. . . . I am not prepared to say that one 
can never form a ‘citizen-like’ relationship with multiple sovereigns, but mere ‘continuous and systematic 
activity’ does not begin to capture this citizen-like relationship.”). 
187. See Rhodes, Nineteenth Century, supra note 23, at 428–29 (“If a corporation is conducting core 
executive and administrative functions within a state, such as controlling its operations, billing its customers, 
accounting for its financial status, managing its employees, and establishing its pricing structure, it is acting in a 
similar manner to a local business in the state.”); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at 1141 (“The 
community . . . in which [a corporation] has its head office occupies a position somewhat analogous to that of 
the community of a natural person’s domicile and habitual residence.”). Contra Hoffheimer, supra note 20, at 
599 n.279 (“The location of executive offices has no necessary relationship to corporate activity that generates 
business or that constitutes the contacts and presence traditionally required for general jurisdiction.”); Stein, 
Meaning, supra note 7, at 546 (“[T]here is no need . . . to privilege the locus of corporate decision-making [in 
determining where corporations are subject to general jurisdiction]. . . . It is particularly important for courts to 
take into consideration how invested a defendant is in the forum state, and how apparent that investment is to 
the community. Accordingly, the number of employees should count, as well as other indicia of presence, such 
as manufacturing facilities or corporate offices.”) (citations omitted). 
188. See supra notes 96–104 and accompanying text (discussing the fairness concerns inherent in a 
diversity subject matter jurisdiction analysis in terms of local bias); Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1192 (“[T]he general 
purpose of diversity jurisdiction . . . [is] to find the State where a corporation is least likely to suffer out-of-state 
prejudice when it is sued in local court.”); supra notes 27–28, 36 and accompanying text (discussing the 
fairness concerns inherent in a personal jurisdiction analysis in terms of minimum contacts with the forum). 
189. See supra notes 96–104 and accompanying text. 
190. See supra notes 130–133 and accompanying text. 
191. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (quoting Int’l Shoe Corp. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)) (“The Due Process Clause, by ensuring the ‘orderly administration of 
the laws,’ gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their 
primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to 
suit.”). 
192. Rhodes, Predictability Principle, supra note 13, at 137 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 
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test to mean a corporation’s state of incorporation and the one state in which the 
corporation has its (pseudo-) headquarters best accommodates both needs.193 A 
corporation clearly will know from which state it obtained its corporate charter, 
and it is fairly easy for an adversary to determine a potential corporate 
defendant’s state of incorporation.194 While determining in which state a court 
would deem a corporation’s principal place of business to be located may not 
always be as straightforward, the “nerve center” test will at least lead in “a single 
direction, towards the center of overall direction,” rather than requiring the 
parties to weigh various categories of contacts (like assets, sales, and property) in 
order to render a guess.195 Thus, in today’s marketplace, where “many major 
business entities do substantially systematic and continuous business in many if 
not every state,”196 defining the principal place of business as the nerve center 
provides the most predictable results. 
 
at 291–92) (“Predictability insures both that nonresidents will be able to structure their transactions to avoid the 
sovereign jurisdictional prerogative of a foreign state and that litigants will have some guidance as to when a 
jurisdictional challenge may be appropriate.”); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at 1137 (“[J]ustice 
requires a certain and predictable place where a person can be reached by those having claims against him.”). 
193. See Feder, supra note 15, at 693 (quoting von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at 1137) 
(“Doing business jurisdiction also falls short when viewed in light of another core justification for general 
jurisdiction: the notion that ‘justice requires a certain and predictable place where a person can be reached by 
those having claims against him.’ So long as the defendant’s state of incorporation and/or its principal place of 
business remain available, this purpose is satisfied, and provides no reason to extend jurisdiction to multiple 
other locations.”). Limiting the general jurisdiction test in this manner also prevents forum-shopping by 
plaintiffs. For example, a forum state will almost always apply its own statute of limitations to a claim, no 
matter where the claim arose. E.g., Shannon Mcghee Hernandez, Comment, Civil Procedure—Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp.: The Reasonableness Inquiry in the Context of General 
Jurisdiction, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 723, 740 (1997) (citing Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722–23 
(1988)). And, some forums are “magnets for litigation . . . because of their tendency to render large jury 
awards.” Stein, Meaning, supra note 7, at 540–41. Thus, when corporations are subject to general jurisdiction in 
numerous locations, plaintiffs are able to forum shop for, among other things, the most favorable law and the 
most sympathetic juries. See, e.g., Stein, Frontiers, supra note 176, at 384–85 (discussing the effects of forum 
shopping); Hernandez, supra, at 739–40 (“Plaintiffs are often motivated to forum shop not because they seek 
the most convenient forum for themselves—or the least convenient one for the defendant—but rather because 
they want to take advantage of the law of a particular forum.”); Lee Scott Taylor, Registration Statutes, 
Personal Jurisdiction, and the Problem of Predictability, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1194 (2003) (“Statutes of 
limitations . . . are not the only problem associated with forum shopping. There are significant intangible 
considerations: perceived jury predispositions, judicial personalities, and the political responsiveness of state 
judiciaries, among others.”). 
194. See Harry C. Sigman, Improvements (?) to the UCC Article 9 Filing System, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 457, 
482 (2010–2011) (“[S]tates maintain filed corporate charters as a public record . . . .”). 
195. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1194 (2010); see Sarah R. Cebik, “A Riddle Wrapped in a 
Mystery Inside an Enigma”: General Personal Jurisdiction and Notions of Sovereignty, 1998 ANN. SURV. AM. 
L. 1, 11–12 (“Without any predictability in the courts’ behavior, it is impossible for a defendant to structure 
conduct so as to avoid or subject itself to general jurisdiction. . . . Such unpredictability not only allows judges 
to act in a relatively arbitrary manner but also raises the costs of litigation since the attorneys in any matter are 
less likely to estimate properly which states will have jurisdiction over the defendant. This significantly lessens 
the value of the doctrine of personal jurisdiction—particularly general personal jurisdiction.”). 
196. Stravitz, Sayonara, supra note 31, at 759. 
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Finally, the “fair play and substantial justice” component of the due process 
analysis, as articulated in International Shoe, has been interpreted by the Court to 
embody a “reasonableness” inquiry that consists of five factors: (1) “the burden 
on the defendant,” (2) “the interests of the forum State,” (3) “the plaintiff’s 
interest in obtaining relief,” (4) “‘the interstate judicial system’s interest in 
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,’” and (5) “‘the shared 
interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social 
policies.’”197 While some commentators debate whether these factors are 
applicable in the general jurisdiction analysis (or whether they are intended to 
apply only in the specific jurisdiction context),198 most agree that they should 
be.199 
The Court did not explicitly address these factors in Goodyear; however, its 
“essentially at home” test, when viewed in light of the Court’s language and 
precedent as discussed in this Article, is inherently reasonable (and, therefore, 
needed no further explanation from the Court).200 First, there can be no question 
that the burden on the corporate defendant of litigating in the state where it has 
its corporate headquarters would be minimal. After all, it likely would have local 
attorneys on call who are familiar with its business, and it would have key 
executives and documents readily available.201 While the burden of litigating in 
 
197. Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (quoting World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)); see, e.g., Walter W. Heiser, Toward 
Reasonable Limitations on the Exercise of General Jurisdiction, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1035, 1040–41 (2004) 
(discussing the genesis of the “reasonableness” factors); Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, supra note 
23, at 899 (same); Stravitz, Sayonara, supra note 31, at 752–53 (same). 
198. See Hoffheimer, supra note 20, at 588–89 & n.229 (stating that “[i]t was never entirely clear” 
whether the reasonableness factors should be considered in the general jurisdiction analysis); Rhodes, 
Clarifying General Jurisdiction, supra note 23, at 899 (“[T]he Supreme Court did not specifically resolve 
whether these factors also apply to assertions of general jurisdiction rather than the specific jurisdiction that was 
at issue in Asahi and its prior decisions adopting these criteria.”); Silberman, supra note 69, at 594–95 (“[T]here 
seems to be some doubt as to whether the reasonableness prong applies in cases of general jurisdiction . . . .”); 
Stravitz, Sayonara, supra note 31, at 758 (noting that none of the Court’s general jurisdiction opinions address 
the reasonableness factors). 
199. See Heiser, supra note 197, at 1042 (citing George, supra note 32, at 1129–41) (“[T]here is nothing 
in the Supreme Court’s discussions of these factors to indicate they apply only in specific jurisdiction cases. 
Indeed, . . . concerns about whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable and fair should actually be 
heightened in general jurisdiction cases.”); Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, supra note 23, at 899–901 
(stating that the reasonableness factors should be part of the general jurisdiction analysis); Silberman, supra  
note 69, at 595 (“[G]eneral jurisdiction may present the strongest case for . . . invocation [of the reasonableness 
factors].”); cf. Stravitz, Sayonara, supra note 31, at 758 (stating that lower courts have applied the 
reasonableness factors in general jurisdiction cases) (citations omitted). But see Hernandez, supra note 193, at 
741 (arguing that the states’ interests in resolving a dispute are inherently weak in the general jurisdiction 
context and should not play any role in the analysis). 
200. Similarly, it has been argued that Justice Ginsburg invoked, without explicitly naming, the 
reasonableness factors in her McIntyre dissent. See Stravitz, Sayonara, supra note 31, at 757. 
201. See Heiser, supra note 197, at 1043 (“The inquiries relevant here include the location of potential 
witnesses, documents, and records; [and] whether the defendant has a subsidiary or agent, maintains an office or 
other physical presence, in the forum . . . .”). 
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the state of incorporation may be greater for an entity that does no business there, 
modern transportation and communication abilities greatly lessen the 
inconvenience.202 Second, the state of incorporation and the state in which the 
corporation’s nerve center is located are the corporation’s “home” states, and 
states have a great interest in determining the rights and obligations of their 
citizens.203 Third, while the plaintiff’s interest in “obtaining convenient and 
effective relief” will depend in large part upon who the plaintiff is,204 having a 
predictable location in which a defendant may be subject to suit on any claim 
will, at the very least, reduce the cost and uncertainty inherent in litigation.205 
Fourth, at least some efficiency in litigation will be achieved by virtue of suing a 
defendant in its home forum because the defendant will not contest jurisdiction 
through time-consuming pre-trial motion practice.206 And, fifth, subjecting a 
foreign-country corporation to general jurisdiction in the United States only when 
the corporation has essentially made itself at home in a particular state furthers 
foreign relations policies.207 
The interpretation of “essentially at home” proposed in this Article satisfies 
due process requirements in ways the proposed tests discussed in Part II.C. 
cannot. For example, while it may seem fair in some instances to hale a 
defendant into court in a state in which it does a substantial amount of business, 
utilizing a corporate operations-related factor test (like the tests proposed by 
Professor Stein, Professor Hoffheimer, and Ms. Peddie) inhibits the goals of 
predictability and reasonableness inherent in the due process analysis. Leaving 
open the possibility that courts in an indefinite number of states may be able to 
assert general jurisdiction over a corporation (as suggested by Professor Rhodes) 
similarly yields unpredictability. And, foreclosing the possibility of being able to 
sue a foreign-country defendant somewhere in the United States (which would be 
 
202. See Hoffheimer, supra note 20, at 590 (“Requiring continuous and systematic contacts comparable 
to the defendants’ legal home . . . protects corporate defendants from the burden of litigating in seriously 
inconvenient places.”); Wasserman, supra note 1, at 349 (“[M]odern technology, communications, travel, and 
commerce make it easier for people and entities to reach into and engage in foreign forums through their 
conduct and also to litigate there . . . .”) (citations omitted). 
203. See Hoffheimer, supra note 20, at 590 (“Requiring continuing and systematic contacts comparable 
to the defendants’ legal home assures that such states will have real interests in providing forums . . . .”). 
204. See Heiser, supra note 197, at 1045 (“The relevant inquiries here may include whether the plaintiff 
is a resident or domiciliary of the forum state, where the plaintiff suffered injury, whether the forum state is 
more convenient for witnesses or other evidence than some other available forum, whether the plaintiff has a 
financial or physical ability to litigate elsewhere, whether all the parties to the dispute can be joined in the 
chosen forum, and whether the plaintiff will be able to enforce a judgment obtained from the forum.”). 
205. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
206. Id. 
207. See Heiser, supra note 197, at 1048 (quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 
U.S. 102, 115 (1987)) (stating that this factor requires “consideration of the procedural and substantive policies 
of other nations whose interests are affected by the assertion of jurisdiction by a court in the United States” and 
of “‘the Federal Government’s interest in its foreign relations policies.’”). 
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a possibility under Mr. Feder’s reading) may, in some instances, be contrary to 
the notion of “fair play and substantial justice.” 
2.  Promoting Simplicity and Administrative Efficiency 
While not of as prime importance as fairness and predictability, simplicity 
and administrative efficiency are very favorable attributes of a jurisdictional 
test.208 Personal jurisdiction tends to be a hotly contested issue in litigation,209 
eating up not only the parties’ time and money, but also valuable judicial 
resources. The use of complex jurisdictional tests only compounds the problem.210 
On the other hand, using a simple test to “limit the scope of general jurisdiction 
to a set of clearly defined circumstances [will] provide certainty and 
administrative efficiency.”211 
The interpretation of the “essentially at home” test articulated in this Article 
is both simple and administratively efficient; the Court already explained as 
much in Hertz. In that case, the Court rejected the “corporate activities” and 
“total activity” tests used by some lower courts to determine a corporation’s 
principal place of business because the tests were too complicated and required 
consideration of too many factors.212 Instead, the Court adopted the “nerve 
center” test because it is “[comparatively] simple to apply” and will not consume 
judicial resources.213 Similarly, the “essentially at home” tests based on revenue, 
employee count, the location of manufacturing facilities, and “a host of plus 
factors, far too lengthy to list” (as proposed by Professor Stein, Professor 
Hoffheimer, and Ms. Peddie)214 involve contemplation of multiple factors and 
would invite too much time-consuming and unnecessary litigation.215 Thus, those 
tests should be disregarded in favor of a “state of incorporation and (pseudo-) 
nerve center” test.216 The state of incorporation will be readily apparent, so 
 
208. See supra notes 125–129 and accompanying text; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 
U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (quoting Int’l Shoe Corp. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)) (“[T]he Due Process 
Clause ensures not only fairness, but also the ‘orderly administration of the laws . . . .’”). 
209. See Russell J. Weintraub, A Map Out of the Personal Jurisdiction Labyrinth, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 531, 531 (1995) (“[T]he threshold determination of personal jurisdiction has become one of the most 
litigated issues in state and federal courts.”). 
210. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1193 (2010) (“[A]dministrative simplicity is a major 
virtue in a jurisdictional statute. Complex jurisdictional tests complicate a case, eating up time and money as the 
parties litigate, not the merits of their claims, but which court is the right court to decide those claims. . . . 
Judicial resources too are at stake.”). 
211. Twitchell, Myth, supra note 23, at 681. 
212. Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1194. 
213. Id. at 1193. 
214. See supra Part II.C.  
215. Peddie, supra note 7, at 726; see supra notes 70–78 and accompanying text. 
216. See Twitchell, Myth, supra note 23, at 676 (stating that limiting general jurisdiction “can provide 
plaintiffs with a forum whose power over a defendant is so undisputed that the parties and the judiciary will not 
need to expend significant resources in the preliminary jurisdictional inquiry.”). 
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making that determination should require extremely minimal use of party or 
court resources. The same will be true for determining the location of a 
corporation’s nerve center in the vast majority of cases where a corporation has 
only one identifiable headquarters. It is true that there will be “hard cases” in 
which it may be difficult to determine, for example, which of a corporation’s 
offices is its “main” office.217 However, outliers would occur under any test, and 
such limited challenges do not outweigh the vast benefits provided by the “nerve 
center” approach. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, the U.S. Supreme 
Court announced a new and somewhat vague test for determining in which states 
a corporation can be subject to general personal jurisdiction: those states in which 
it is “essentially at home.”218 In comparison to the Court’s notorious decision in 
Goodyear’s companion case, J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, the 
nebulous “essentially at home” standard received minimal attention. However, 
Goodyear marked the first time in nearly three decades that the Court addressed 
the issue of general jurisdiction, so it seems unlikely that it will do so again in the 
near future. Therefore, it is imperative that the lower courts, litigators, and 
potential litigants know what that test means. 
This Article proposes the following interpretation of Goodyear: A 
corporation is “at home” only in its state of incorporation and in the one state 
where its principal place of business, or nerve center, is located. In the event the 
corporation’s headquarters is located outside of the United States, it is 
“essentially at home” in the one state, if any, in which it has administrative and 
executive contacts comparable to those found at a corporate headquarters (i.e., a 
pseudo-nerve center). Importantly, this interpretation gives meaning to the 
Court’s express language, which demonstrates its intent to allow for the exercise 
of general jurisdiction over a corporation where it is domiciled—i.e., in its state 
of incorporation and the state in which it has its principal place of business. It 
also properly reconciles Goodyear with the Court’s earlier opinion in Hertz Corp. 
v. Friend, in which the Court determined that a corporation’s principal place of 
business for purposes of diversity subject matter jurisdiction is located at its 
nerve center. In both instances, the Court was trying to determine in which state a 
corporation has such significant contacts that it can be forced to litigate there 
without being subject to local prejudice. Furthermore, this interpretation explains 
 
217. Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1194. The Hertz Court noted that “there will be hard cases” under the “nerve 
center” test, such as the corporation that divides its supervisory functions among multiple locations, but that at 
least “[c]ourts do not have to try to weigh corporate functions, assets, or revenues different in kind, one from the 
other.” Id. 
218. 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011). 
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the Court’s use of such a vague standard by allowing for the exercise of general 
jurisdiction over a corporation that is not domiciled in the United States, but that 
does have contacts with a particular state that are comparable to having a 
principal place of business there. Finally, in addition to explaining the Court’s 
express language, interpreting “essentially at home” as proposed in this Article 
will not only promote fairness and predictability for the defendant—central 
concerns when exercising personal jurisdiction and applying the Due Process 
Clause—but it also will promote simplicity and administrative efficiency. 
 
